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 This	  Ph.D.	   thesis	   consists	   in	   three	   research	  papers	   focused	  on	   the	   relationship	  between	  media	   industry	   and	   the	   financial	   sector.	   The	   importance	   of	   a	   correct	  understanding	   what	   is	   the	   effect	   of	   media	   on	   financial	   markets	   is	   becoming	  increasingly	   important	   as	   long	   as	   fully	   informed	  markets	   hypothesis	   has	   been	  challenged	   and	   disputed.	   Therefore,	   if	   financial	  markets	   do	   not	   have	   access	   to	  complete	   information,	   the	   importance	   of	   information	   professionals,	   i.e.	   the	  media	   firms,	   follows.	   On	   the	   other	   side,	   another	   challenge	   for	   economic	   and	  finance	   scholar	   is	   to	   understand	   to	  which	   extent	   financial	   features	   are	   able	   to	  influence	  media	   firms	   and	   consequentially	   to	   condition	   information	   disclosure	  and	  spread.	  The	   main	   aim	   of	   this	   Ph.D.	   dissertation	   is	   to	   contribute	   to	   a	   better	  comprehension	   both	   the	   phenomena.	   The	   first	   paper,	   entitled	   “The	   Media	  Ownership	  Effect”,	  analyzes	  the	  effects	  of	  owning	  equity	  shares	  in	  a	  newspaper-­‐publishing	   firm.	   The	   main	   findings	   show	   how	   for	   a	   firm	   being	   part	   of	   the	  ownership	  structure	  of	  a	  media	  firm	  ends	  to	  receive	  more	  and	  qualitative	  better	  coverage.	  This	  confirms	  the	  view	  in	  which	  owning	  a	  media	  outlet	   is	  a	  source	  of	  conflicts	  of	   interest.	  The	  second	  paper	   focuses	  on	   the	  effect	  of	  media-­‐delivered	  information	  on	   financial	  markets.	   In	   the	   framework	  of	   initial	   public	   offering	   in	  the	  U.S.	  stock	  market,	  we	  found	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	   the	  media	  role	  in	  the	  IPO	  pricing.	  Specifically,	  increasing	  the	  quantity	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  coverage	  increases	  the	  first-­‐day	  returns	  (i.e.	  the	  underpricing).	  Finally	  the	  third	  paper	  tries	  to	  summarize	  what	  has	  been	  done	  in	  studying	  the	  relationship	  between	   media	   and	   financial	   industries,	   putting	   together	   contributes	   from	  economic,	  business,	  and	  financial	  scholars.	  The	   main	   finding	   of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   therefore	   to	   have	   underlined	   the	  importance	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   media	   industry	  and	  the	  financial	  sector,	  contributing	  to	  the	  stream	  of	  research	  that	  investigates	  about	   the	   media	   role	   and	   media	   effectiveness	   in	   the	   financial	   and	   business	  sectors.	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The Media Ownership Effect
Carlo Raimondo∗
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of particular financial characteristics in the media industry, with a specific
focus on the conflicts of interest that may arise along with the ownership structures of media firms. In a
sample of 127.190 articles published by the leading Italian newspapers in the period between 2007 and
2011 we find extensive empirical evidence that firms owing shares in a newspaper-publishing company
receive a better ”treatment” on the newspaper itself, both in terms of quality and quantity of coverage
they receive. This paper also contributes to the textual analysis methodology applied to financial contents
providing the first content analysis method to analyze Italian financial texts.
I. Introduction
In which extents is finance able to influence the media industry? Is single media’s reputation asufficient counterweight to make the media resist to external powerful pressures? Answeringthese questions is the key point of this research paper. To address these issues I analyze
a central topic related to the media industry: the media ownership. Firms and individuals
owning a media firm may be tempted to use their power to obtain a better or a greater coverage.
Being positively covered by media could produce desirable outcomes in terms of reputation and
appearance. The usual argument proposed against this framework involves media reputation and
competitiveness. A media who decides to publish news in favor of its owner(s) could easily noticed
by the public and the public itself could decide to change news dealer in order to avoid the biased
one. Evidences from everyday life and from scientific literature poorly support this theoretical
concept. In the market for news it is difficult to understand how people decide to choose their
informational sources: surely they do not decide excluding biased sources. In addition, from time
to time being totally biased (or even partisan) about some specific topic provide a sort of benefit
for readers they want their beliefs to be confirmed. This applies above all on political topics easily
explain the very large number of declared biased media, especially among the newspapers.
Nevertheless this research is not interested in how political facts and arguments are reported,
but it is focused on corporate and financial reporting. In this subset we would not expect to
∗PhD Student, University of Bologna, Department of Management, Via Capo di lucca 34, 40126 Bologna, Italy.
Corresponding author: carlo.raimondo@unibo.it.
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find any a priori preference for not unbiased news. If media are actually delivering important
news, readers are expected to strictly prefer those media who report news in the better and most
objective way possible. In this research paper I will show how in the daily newspaper industry
the most circulated sources are systematically writing better articles for a precise set of subjects,
i.e. those in conflict of interests with the media firm. I will analyze all the articles published by
top five Italian daily newspapers about all listed firms in a five-year period. The main aim is to
prove the relation between holding shares of a media firm and receiving a special treatment from
the media firm itself.
This paper is organized as follow: in Section II a literature review will be proposed. Section III
presents the hypotheses development. In Section IV I provide detail on data and methodology,
with a specific focus on the textual analysis I developed. Section V presents the empirical results,
whilst Section VI provides some robustness checks. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. Related Researches
The role of information in the economy has been stressed since Von Hayek (Hayek 1945) work about
knowledge diffusion and availability. Individual and organizations need to be correctly informed
and, on the other hand, they need to correctly communicate their contents to the wide public. The
role of information is even more important when it regards financial markets and publicly traded
instruments, where informative advantage is vital for individuals and organizations.
In the information disclosure process a pivotal role is played by the media firms, as they act
as information intermediaries, finding, selecting, commenting, and dealing to the vast public
pieces of news. They role is furthermore even more crucial considering the credibility they are
able to convey to a story telling, using their reputational capital to create around a fact or an
analysis the level of attention requested to transform it in an actual news. Media are then able to
(1) select a single event and transform it in a news, to (2) vehicle their opinion about the event,
and consequentially to (3) importantly influence firms and organizations. The ways in which
media may affect firms are several: they may influence the asset pricing (Dyck and Zingales
2003, Tetlock 2007, Barber and Odean 2008, Bhattacharya et al. 2009, Dougal et al. 2012, Garcia
2013), they may play a watchdog role against frauds (Miller 2006, Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales
2008, Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010), they may generate important firm’s reputation changes
(Moy and Pfau 2000, Eccles, Newquist, and Schatz 2007). Media importance for the economic
sector is therefore prominent especially whenever firms have to deal with the vast public. This
characteristic changes following the diversity in economic sector but it is exactly the same going to
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firms that issue publicly traded financial instruments. Being the latter the biggest part of several
leading economies, media influence on business activities cannot be banished in consumers based
industries. Given these facts, for corporate finance scholars analyzing media industry functioning
mechanism and the degree of efficiency of the whole sector has become a pivotal challenge for
better understand financial markets patterns as well as a complete bouquet of corporate finance
hot topics, like for instance the dynamics of an IPO initial returns (Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014,
Bhattacharya et al. 2009, Pollock and Rindova 2003).
The central point of this research paper is the challenge to correctly understand what drives the
mechanisms the media follow in deciding whether a fact or an event has to be covered and how to
transform the fact in a piece of news in terms of treatment and embedded judgments. This activity
is probably one of the core procedures in the professional journalism together with the ability
of understanding the difference between what is actually interesting for the public and what is
not. This research does not aim to state if an event is effectively a news or not, but it wants to
disentangle which are the determinants that affect (1) the probability to be covered for a firm and
(2) the probability of receiving positive or negative comments for the firm itself. The approach
I use hereafter is based on a conflict of interest view in which individuals and organizations
(firms) that own a media outlet use their influence to force the media to produce news in favor
of their private interests, different by the interests of the media itself. Owning a media firm, or
being part of its ownership structure, is here viewed as an investment in term of reputation and
communication instead of a regular financial participation. This research wants to test in which
degree this strong assessment is precise, basing on empirical testing in an international sample
using also advanced natal language processing techniques.
This research is very deeply rooted in both economic and financial literature. Starting form
Jensen 1979 (Jensen 1979), previous researches show as media can be effective on stock markets,
influencing them in a more complex way than being just information dealers. Media may generate
stock markets reactions even though they are conveying actual new information through a sort
of attention effect. Disentangling the media action has been widely investigated in the financial
literature. Several scholars confirm the presence of the informative effect, i.e. the process in which
media are able to transmit to the markets and generally speaking to the public. A large body of
literature has proved how media are able to effectively influence financial markets in a wide range
of diverse situations. Firstly media are able to convey to the public information that is really new
and really informative. In their 2003 work Dyck and Zingales (Dyck and Zingales 2003) show
how the media reporting of financial news - specifically earning announcement related news -
are able to influence investors’ behaviours. The authors state the media are really providing new
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information to the public, especially because of their ability to access private information directly
through the firms involved; the latter ones are willing to concede private information to the media
and, indirectly, to the public in order to maintain a qui pro quod special relations with the media
itself. In this view media and firms take advantage both from their special relation. Fang Peress in
their 2009 paper (Fang and Peress 2009) study the cross sections of stock returns as influenced
by media coverage and they the breadth of information dissemination affects returns. Dougal et
al. (Dougal et al. 2012) differently find out a causal relation between a daily column content on
the Wall Street Journal and the stock market average return. Joe et al. (Joe, Louis, and Robinson
2009) show how markets react to bad news of inefficient boards member in the U.S. stock market,
generating substitutions in boards’ compositions and pushing retail investors to shift their wealth
allocations to different firms.
Media often do not generate or deal new information, i.e. information that is totally new and
unknown to the markets participants, but they are able to make investors changing their preference,
modifying the investor sentiment. Tetlock 2007, Tetlock 2011, Barber and Odean 2008; Solomon
2012; Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 2004; Frieder and Subrahmanyam 2005; Meschke 2003 all
prove that investors react to media exposure independently to which is the actual facts at the base
of media reporting. Huberman and Regev(Huberman and Regev 2001) even show as markets
react to media outcomes that are not actually conveying any new information. Media are so very
powerful opinion makers also in financial markets, generating waves of positive and negative
sentiment inside the investors’ community, regardless that the underlying situation could be.
Media are then important and effective for markets and, consequentially, potentially harmful if
they do not accomplish their role correctly, professionally, and accurately. Media have indeed a
right and powerful incentive to produce correct information, as far as they are competing in a
market in which customers (readers, audience) are willing to pick the highest quality outlet in
term of precise and not-slanted reporting. Unfortunately competition in media industry seems
not to be able to produce this desirable outcome. Mullainathan and Shleifer (Mullainathan and
Shleifer 2005) show as audience wants to have its beliefs confirmed, generating in this way a
sort of demand for biased reporting. George and Waldfogel (George and Waldfogel 2003) and
Gentzkow and Shapiro (Gentzkow and J. M. Shapiro 2008; Gentzkow and J. M. Shapiro 2010) also
argue similarly, introducing the elements of audience heterogeneity as pivotal concept for beliefs
confirmation hypothesis: more audience members have very different beliefs and tastes, more
difficult it would become for the media to produce the correspondent biased information useful to
confirm their ideas and so to be liked. According to them a media outlet with very wide audience
heterogeneity will produce better information.
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If heterogeneity in audience tastes produces better informative outcomes for political topics,
speaking about economic and financial reporting we should be in presence of a sort of market
mechanism for which slanted reporting are actually discarded or not even proposed to the
audience because in this setting ”tastes” do not actually exist, with the only exception of a general
and strong preference for real informative and potentially effective news. Nobody prefers a priori
firm A to firm B, and then he decides to buy the media who reserve the better service to firm
A. Regard to economic and financial news the reputation effect it should work perfectly. In this
research we want to study a specific framework in which the reputational mechanism for media
firms does not hold and in which media firms, and not audience, has their own tastes in matter of
business reporting. We argue that the ownership structure of media firms systematically affects
media outcomes in sense of reserving a special and better handling for all the firms linked to the
media firm itself, namely the firms holding shares of the media company itself and all the firms
linked to these last ones. In this paper’s view, for a firm owning important amounts of shares of a
media outlet may be a strategic asset to be used in managing the firm reputation, in the sense of
increasing the likelihood to receive a good treatment in terms of positive coverage. In this respect
we expect to find that firms linked to the firm owning the media firm, or linked to the media firm
itself, will gain and will reach a reputational capital that is greater, ceteris paribus, than that would
have received if not linked to media firm. The decision of holding a certain amount of a media
firm is then not determined by the expectation about the economic results of the media and so to
the pro quota return on the investment in financial term, but it will be decided by the expected
amount of benefits the firm desires to extract using its managing rights. Furthermore has to be
noticed how the private benefits of being part of the managing group of a media firm may be not
just pro quota like the financial ones but entire. In other words if also some slanted news about
firm A, that is part of the ownership structure of the media firm, would lead to a decrease in the
total earning of the media firm, it will happen that (1) firm A will receive all the private benefits
coming from a good reporting and, at the same time, (2) firm A will bear only the pro quota cost
of this operation, generating a strong incentive for firm A to push the media firm in producing
benevolently slanted reporting about firm A itself. We argue though that media firm ownership
structure could be a critical point for the media sector, if interested in not-slanted reporting.
This will not be the first research studying ownership dynamic in the media industry, several issues
have been already investigated in past researches. There are several papers investigating about
the consequences of having a state-controlled ownership structure. Djankov et al. (Djankov et al.
2003) conduct a vast research on media ownership in an international context (97 countries). They
found that State-ownership of media is not consistent with the idea of public interest according to
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which States cure market failures and they also underline the possible threat in terms of conflicts
of interest of state-controlled media. Besley and Prat (Besley and Prat 2006) improve a model
explaining why organizations and, particularly, governments have strong incentives trying to
control the media and consequentially the external opinion on themselves. The authors also
underline other two points that are very important: firstly the media ownership structure plays
a pivotal role on the media’s ability to resist to external pressures and it is strictly tied with the
media independence and, secondly, that the lack of independence (like the existence of some
conflicts of interests) does affect the outcomes, i.e. it has effects on the news produced. The paper
by Houston, Lin, and Ma (Houston, Lin, and Ma 2011) confirm the previous results providing
also strong empirical evidence. Gentzkow and Shapiro (Gentzkow and J. Shapiro 2006) put in
evidence the relationship between ownership structure independence and competition, where
more concentrated ownership in the media industry may lead to less competition and then to
undermine the quality control market function. Both the working papers by Della Vigna and
Kennedy (Della Vigna and Kennedy 2011) and by Durante and Knight (Durante and Knight 2011)
underline the potential pitfalls that the ownership structure of the media firms may generate,
using the viewpoint of the conflicts of interest: in the first case the danger is related to the holding
linkage between media firms and other firms, while in the second case a complex case of conflict
of interest between business and politics is presented. Following this framework, this research
wants to systematically investigate the effects of being part of the ownership structure of a media
firm in term of coverage directly received by the media itself.
Several considerations could emerge from this work’s results. The value of the this research
is in fact mainly in the theoretical and practical implications that would arise from the paper’s
obtained evidence.
From the first perspective the proposed framework arises a very important point in describing the
complex relation between media industry and finance. For a firm, being part of the ownership
structure of a media firm could be a precise decision related also to its communication strategy
and investor relation management. Being constantly positively covered by a media may turn
out in decreasing the reputational risk exposure for both the firm and its executives. In other
words if my predictions will be confirmed, I might observe the presence in the ownership
structure of a media firm as a sort of hedging policy against negative coverage on the media itself.
Furthermore, regarding to the listed company owning shares in media firms, I may observe not
normal information diffusion to the vast public and consequentially systematic biases in the stock
price formation mechanism, where uninformed investors who trust the media - even partially
owned by the firm itself - will end to overprice the firm stock price, generating in this way an
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equilibrium price for the stock that is artificially higher than in a normal situation with no conflicts
of interest due to media ownership patterns.
Summarizing this research results could be important and potentially effective for both the streams
of literature related to (1) the connection between financial issues and information spreading
pattern and to (2) the media ownership characteristics and their effect on the quality of the news.
From the second perspective the results of this research may be relevant for both the viewpoint of
practitioners and policy makers and regulators. Practitioners and financial professionals could
be very interested in understanding which part of the available information media owners have
influenced and which part of information is instead not affected by any conflicts of interest. This
pattern may also results in different financial markets’ reactions when we are dealing with news
about publicly listed firms. Financial literature has shown how media may affect the financial
markets both when they delivering effectively new information (for instance Dyck and Zingales
2003) and when they are only putting some topic in the spotlight (for instance Tetlock 2011). Be
able to understand which one of the two situations is really happening in a certain moment of time
could be crucial to properly assess the correct strategy in terms of investments or disinvestment
policies.
The expectations of this paper could be even more important in terms of regulation and policy
decision for public regulators (e.g. CONSOB or Bankitalia) and financial markets’ coordinators.
If information is viewed as a public good that has to be regulated and correctly distributed to
markets participants, to have a systematically biased source of news is something not desirable
and that has to be regulated. If data will confirm the expectations of this research public regulators
could be able to correctly detect and regulate the kind of conflict of interest between media and
firm owning the media in order to preserve a correct and possibly unbiased information for all
the agents operating on the markets. More generally, the results of this research would confirm
the importance of a correct understanding of information generation process and its diffusion
mechanism to the markets, as an increasing an innovative stream of literature in the financial
economics field is proposing gaining an increasing importance. This paper’s evidence would
perfectly frame in this innovative literature.
III. Hypotheses Development
As previously observed the importance of media in the information dealing system is indisputable.
However, only a little attention has been paid until now to the potential pitfalls that could arise
together with this powerful mechanism. If media are introducing their preferences in the news
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they are spreading to the public, all the system is working on a false base, i.e. on the base of
an informative set that is partially adulterate by media themselves. Despite the potential huge
proportion of the phenomenon, only a little attention has been devoted to it by financial and
economic literature. Some scholars have instead successfully studied this issue from a political
point of view. In the political market, i.e. the general elections, political parties received better
treatment from ”friend media”. Among the others, Della Vigna and Kaplan (DellaVigna and
Kaplan 2007) show as receiving better coverage from the media is actually effective in terms of
electoral outcomes. Closer to this research is the 2012 paper by Gal-Or et al. (Gal-or, Geylani, and
Yildirim 2012) in which the authors present a model according to which media reserve a better
treatment in terms of coverage to firms that buy greater amount of advertisement. Furthermore
Durante e Knight in their 2012 paper (durante2012 ) studied the effect of owning media outlet and
they prove its relation with being successful in a political competition. The aim of this research
would be to put together these different contributions that refer to different setting and that
they are hardly generalizable in a new framework that explicitly refers to financial markets and
their potentially harmful relation with the media sector. I argue the phenomenon is even more
important because of the proved effective of media products on the financial markets.
More explicitly, on the basis of the above reported arguments, it is possible to suggest the
following hypotheses:
For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure influences the probability to receive
coverage by the media itself. (H1)
For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure increases the probability to receive coverage
by the media itself. (H1a)
For a firm, not being part of the media firm’s ownership structure decreases the probability to receive
coverage by the media itself. (H1b)
And then going to the coverage’s quality:
For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure influences the probability to receive
positive coverage by the media itself. (H2)
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For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure increases the probability to receive positive
coverage by the media itself. (H2a)
For a firm, not being part of the media firm’s ownership structure decreases the probability to receive
positive coverage by the media itself. (H2b)
That leads to:
For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure influences the probability to receive
negative coverage by the media itself. (H3)
For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure decreases the probability to receive negative
coverage by the media itself. (H3a)
For a firm, not being part of the media firm’s ownership structure increases the probability to receive
negative coverage by the media itself. (H3b)
And to:
For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure influences the probability to receive
coverage representing uncertainty by the media itself. (H4)
For a firm, being part of the media firm’s ownership structure decreases the probability to receive coverage
representing uncertainty by the media itself. (H4a)
For a firm, not being part of the media firm’s ownership structure increases the probability to receive
coverage representing uncertainty by the media itself. (H4b)
The confirmation of the research hypotheses (i.e. the existence of a systematic bias in the
news generation process in favor of firms involved in the ownership structure of the media firm)
would confirm the importance of the role played in the information industry by the existence of
severe conflicts of interest between media industry and the other ones and would enrich financial
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literature of a fundamental contribution able to help the understanding of a debated phenomenon
like the relation between media and finance is. At the same time this research’s results would help
to explain the difference in media treatment that firms received.
IV. Data and Methodology
One of the main aspirations of this research paper is to provide a new methodology to analyze
textual data, in order to obtain a new dataset basing on previously not usable and never used
relevant textual data. Be able to objectively e systematically analyze daily newspapers’ articles
in order to study the relationship between ownership patterns and news outcomes is a crucial
point of this work I am going to describe in details data and methodology in this section. From
this viewpoint, this paper has the ambition to be the first research paper analyzing in a deep and
extensive way Italian newspapers’ articles referred to the business and financial sector, with a
proper procedure I realized ad hoc for this kind of contents.
I. Data Collection
Articles, published on daily newspapers, represent the main unit of analysis of this research paper.
I restrict the number of articles analyzed following the research design in several ways. First I
chose the most important Italian daily newspapers by diffusion, excluding the sportive ones and
those with unconventional pattern in the ownership structure of the correspondent publishing firm1.
Data about diffusion comes from an independent agency called Accertamento e Diffusione Stampa, a
consortium formed by advertising buyers and publishing firms with the mission of monitoring
the diffusion of media contents. I also restrict the sample excluding those newspapers not indexed
on the main news collection databases (i.e. Lexis-Nexis and Factiva). This process ends with the
choice of five high-diffused Italian daily newspapers, namely Il Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La
Stampa, Il Giornale, and Il Resto del Carlino. For those newspapers I search and download all the
news referred to all Italian listed firms together with a number of unlisted firms that have a role
in the Italian newspaper industry2. Furthermore, data are referring to a five-year period, from
January 2007 to December 2011, allowing to consider time varying fixed effects3. Following this
1For this reason I do not consider for instance Il Sole 24 Ore, since it is owned by an association (i.e. Confindustria),
or Libero Quotidiano, owned by a foundation. This characteristic of not being juridically a company makes impossible to
correctly determine ownership structure details.
2The sample of news related to unlisted firms refers to the news about all unlisted firms that own any share in at least
one of the considered newspapers. For these firms I search for news on all the five newspapers.
3Having detailed data about time distribution of news allows me to take in account for all the processes that are time
specific, e.g. economic cycle pattern or seasonal phenomena.
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research strategy I obtained a sample of 127,190 articles, all the articles about 263 Italian firms4
published on the five above-cited daily newspapers, in the period spanning from January 2007
to December 2011. These data are then combined with media publishing firms’ ownership data,
obtained from some Bureau Van Dijk databases, namely Amadeus, Orbis, and Aida datasets.
II. Textual Analysis
A key contribution of this research paper is about the methodology used to process a huge amount
of textual data in Italian language, proving a first item that can be used specifically for financial-
related text in Italian language. Textual analysis in the financial context has been deeply changed
and improved by the 2011 paper by Loughran McDonanld (Loughran and McDonald 2011), where
the authors proposed a financial specific set of word lists. Basing on that research, the stream of
literature using textual data in financial sector has improved dramatically (Tetlock 2007; Dougal
et al. 2012; Loughran and McDonald 2013; Garcia 2013). Curiously, before this paper, a similar set
of word lists was not developed for the Italian language. Basing on Loughran McDonald lists for
English language, I built a new set of lists for Italian language. The translation process followed
few but strict rules: provide the best translation possible to the respect of financial and business
sector usage of each single word, be fully comprehensive allowing also a not-biunivocal linkage
between English and Italian words, not include words with an ambiguous sense in the Italian
language. Furthermore I replicate the logic used in Loughran-Mcdonald lists, providing a list of
terms and not a list of lemmas. In order to obtain this property I had to expand the word lists to
consider all the inflected forms. In order to do that correctly and properly I used a linguistic tool
called Morph-It (Zanchetta and Baroni 2005) that maps all Italian terms and their inflections. The
result is a new tool that allows ma to analyze the contents of Italian financial texts and retrieve the
measures of positive, negative, uncertainty, legal, modal weak, and modal strong tones. The tones
are scaled to represent the proportion of tonal words on the total number of words in each text,
avoiding in this way any possible scale generated biases. For positive and negative tones I also
take in account for possible negations of positive and negative words. Since a negated positive
(or negative) word, like not excellent, has a different meaning than the original ones (in this case
excellent), but it is difficult to understand properly the real new meaning, I do not include these
cases in any lists.
4The firms’ sample is formed by the union of all Italian listed firms and all unlisted firms owning a share in the
considered newspaper publishing firms.
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III. Research Design
A crucial point of this research paper is the aim of building strong and consistent analysis basing
on a limited but comprehensive set of data. All the research design and the data description are
conditioned by the decision of maintaining a simple and easy to understand research design that is,
at the same time, able to catch an incredible high number of not-observed and even not-imagined
data potentially important in describing the observed phenomenon. As mentioned before, the
main unit of analysis of this paper is at the article level. Each article is furthermore associated with
a publishing firm (I call it the Newspaper), with a firm that is its main topic (I call it simply Firm),
and with a publishing date (called Date and often aggregated to the year level variable Year or to
the quarter level variable QDate). Furthermore a crucial set of variable is those ones linking the
publishing firm with the article-topic firm, i.e. the variables representing the ownership patterns
in the media industry. The most important and hereafter presented are two: a dummy variable
called Confl and a continuous variable called Own. The dummy variable Confl assumes value equal
to one when there are some ownership linkage between publishing firm and article-topic firm, i.e.
when there is a Conflict of Interest between newspaper’s owners and newspaper’s duty in providing
objective news. The continuous variable Own represents the size of the conflict of interest, as
measured as proportion of shares of the media firm owned by each article-topic firm. The first
critique that could be raised is how I can control for other factors that can influence the media
outcome for a firm, like for instance advertising expenditures, or investor relation management, or
the way in which the single economic sector of the firm is perceived. Furthermore also each single
newspaper may have different characteristics in terms of propensity to be friendly or hostile to
corporations. The number of this kind of pitfalls could be very large and including new variable
to respond in detail to each of that seems not to be very effective. For this reason I decide for a
totally different approach that takes advantage of the specific data structure. In the models I am
going to estimate I am considering both firm and newspaper fixed effects. The great dimension
and the variability present in my data allow me to consider as generated by ownership patterns
only that part of variance not explained by the single firm effect or the single newspaper effect5.
Briefly, this is the framework I am using in the vast part of my empirical analysis. The unit of
analysis is at the article level. Each article is an effectively published article having as attributes
several characteristics: date of publication, article’s publishing newspaper, firm the article refers
to, total number of words in the article, and the complete set of sentiment indicators (i.e. Positive,
Negative, Uncertainty, Legal, Modal Weak, Modal Strong tones). Furthermore I merge these data with
5Actually also quarter and year fixed effects are taken in account in almost all the proposed models.
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the ownership data referred to newspapers’ publishing firms. For each year and for each couple
newspaper-firm6 data about the ownership linkage between the newspaper and the firm is used. I
use two different measures for the ownership linkage: a simple dummy variable that assumes
value equal to one if there are any forms of ownership linkage, and a continuous variable varying
from zero to one representing the share of the newspaper publishing firm owned by the firm
the article is about. In order to correctly analyze the effects of ownership features on the articles’
sentiment as measured by the textual analysis, a binding condition is to be able to disentangle the
ownership effect from all the other firms’ and newspapers’ characteristics that may affect articles’
tone. Instead of going collecting a huge amount of data describing all these features, I decide
to address systematically this issue exploiting the research design in a not-intuitive way. The
following framework is proposed:
Sn, f ,t,i = β0 + β1 fi + β2ni + β3ti + β4 fini + ei
Where Sn, f ,t,i is the sentiment of the i article published on the n newspaper, about the f firm,
in the t date; β1 is the effect of each single firm; β2 is the effect of each single newspaper; β3 is the
effect of each single time period (I use both quarters and year specifications); β4 is the effect of
each each couple firm-newspaper not explained by firm and newspaper fixed effects, i.e. is measuring
the effect of the relation between each firm and each newspaper. I am going to use this measure
together with the above described measures of ownership, i.e. the conflict of interest proxies. In
this way I am linking the results in terms of conflict of interest effects only to what is not actually
described by any characteristics that is either firm specific or newspaper specific. All data about
firm size, profitability, industry, governance, glamour degree, that likely could influence the media
coverage for a firm are therefore implicitly already taken in account. Following the same way of
reasoning all newspaper specific characteristic are already considered too. The strengths of this
approach are twofold: first (1) this measure is extremely precise, leaving no space for measurement
errors, and then (2) this measure is complete and it prevents from omitted variable biases. In this
way I am considering all the variables that vary together with firm or newspaper, even those I am
not thinking about, or those for which data and empirical measures are not available, or they do
not exist at all. Furthermore, as far as quarter fixed effects are also considered, I am also taking in
account for possible variations of the above described effects happening along time.
6Hereafter I will simply call firm the firm the article is about, and newspaper the newspaper that published the article.
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IV. Data Summary Statistics
In order to properly analyze the effect of being part of the ownership structure of a media firm, I
collect a vast set data, consisting in a huge number of articles published by the daily newspapers I
included in the sample. The articles are indeed all the articles about listed Italian firms, both in
conflict and not in conflict with the publishing firms, and a subset of unlisted firms formed by all
those in conflict with at least one publishing firm. Both for listed and unlisted firms articles are
searched between January,1st, 2007 and December, 31st, 2011 (exactly 5 year period). The final
output is formed by 127,190 articles referred to 263 firms. In order to clarify as possible the sample
composition I am reporting in Table 1 the coverage received by the most covered firms, namely by
all the firms that receive at least one hundred articles in at least one newspaper.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Table 1 reports for each firm the total number of articles published in the chosen time window
by the five considered newspapers, separately. Looking carefully at these data it is possible to
start reasoning about coverage patterns. For instance taking a couple of random examples we may
observe how Cofide, a firm in the same holding group of La Repubblica publishing firm, received
the double coverage on the Repubblica newspaper compared to the Corriere della Sera newspaper.
All the coverage details are reported disentangling between the different sources and it also help
to understand how the sample is formed.
Also the time patterns of coverage distribution across periods could be interesting. Coverage
patterns can be both depending from a time trend evolution or showing some seasonal effects. In
the above reported Figure 1 I present data about total coverage distinguishing by quarter.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
From Figure 1 it is possible to understand how the total coverage related to the whole sample.
The general trend is slightly decreasing, passing from more than eight thousands articles in the
first quarter of 2007 to approximately six thousands articles in the last quarter of 2011. Also a
tiny seasonal effect could be noticed, since all the first quarter of each year are associated with a
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greater number of articles than the other quarters of the same year.
Coverage measures are just a part of this paper data. The second and more important part is
that related to the tone indicators. I compute the tone variables for all the articles and in the Figure
2 the average value for all the tones are reported by year.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
In the above reported histogram I reported the evolution of all the tones by year, in this order:
Positive tone, Negative tone, Uncertainty tone, Legal tone, Modal Weak tone, and Modal Strong tone.
The tone are expressed as proportion of tonal words on the total number of words contained in
each article. Consistently with previous studies using similar methodology, the negative tone is on
average dimensional greater than the other ones. The average level of Negative tone is above 2% of
the total number of words, whilst the Positive tone is on average close to 1.5%. Uncertainty tone
and Legal tone are instead just above the 1%. Finally both Modal Weak and Modal Strong are on
average smaller than 0.5%. Furthermore, it is also possible to observe how tone indicators are not
very volatile over time, proving the design validity of the sample selection.
Closer to the focus of this research paper is to observe patterns in coverage and sentiment
distribution not over time but following the existence of a Conflict of Interest, i.e. following the
presence and the magnitude of the ownership linkage between what I define Newspaper and what
I defined Firm7. First attempt to present these kinds of data is in the Table 2, where data about
coverage are presented following the existence of a Conflict of Interest and providing details at the
year level and at the newspaper level.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
I find the above reported table very informative about the size of the central issue of this article
in the Italian economy. Conflict of Interest could be a very effective and important theoretical
framework but the effectiveness and interest of this kind of approach to the financial and business
media reporting is strictly related to the size of the phenomenon. Table 2 indisputably shows the
dimensional size of the Conflict of Interest in the Italian newspapers’ sector and how common
7emphFirm is the firm the article is about, and Newspaper is the newspaper that published the article.
19
Ph.D. Thesis - Carlo Raimondo - carlo.raimondo@unibo.it
perception of high reputed and Conflict of Interest free newspaper could be argued. On the total
of news in our sample (i.e. a subset containing all the news related to Italian listed firms with
few additions) almost the 16% are suffering a Conflict of Interest. Going to each single newspapers,
the Corriere della Sera published the greater number of news in Conflict of Interest: the 39.37%.
La Stampa follows with 22.67% news related to firm suffering Conflict of Interest, then Il Giornale
(13.90%), La Repubblica (4.22%), and Il Resto del Carlino (3.21%).
Being classified as suffering Conflict of Interest is not the best specification I am providing for
measuring the Conflict of Interest. Data reporting precise proportion of publishing firm share are
computed and used in this paper’s empirical analysis. It this then interesting to understand which
is the distribution of articles the suffer a Conflict of Interest, according to the size of the Conflict of
Interest itself. Figure 3 represents exactly this distribution 8.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
From the above reported histogram, some patterns could be detected. First, there is a more than
moderate concentration on the left part of the graph, representing firm taking a relevant share
in the newspapers’ publishing firms without having the majority of the shares (from 5% to 29%).
Then relatively few firms hold a share that is able to maintain the total control without totally
owing the media firm. Finally a discreet number of firm owns totally the media firms. It is
represented by the very right column: more than the 3% of the total number of articles is referred
to firms owing the 100% of the media itself9.
Having described the summary statistics for the observed phenomena at the best of my data
allow me, the next step is to present and describe briefly the main variables I am going to use in
the empirical models. As mentioned before, one aim of this paper is to be as simple as possible in
data analysis and also this part reflects this research design choice. Variables presented in the next
table are indeed the core engine of all this research paper.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
8(I am here taking in account only for firm suffering Conflict of Interest, firm they do not would be represented by a big
column on the 0 value making all the graph more difficult to be understood.)
9This data is so high also I considered in the sample of news also the news referred to the publishing firm itself that, by
definition, owns the 100% of itself.
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Table 3 presents the main variables used in this work in three panels. Panel A presents all the
variables related to the textual analysis part. It is possible to observe that in mean (median) each
article is formed by 344 (265) words, among those the 1.7% (1.4%) are positive, the 2.2% (2.0%) are
negative, the 1.1% (1.0%) are related to uncertainty, the 1.2% (1.0%) are legal or litigious, the 0.4%
(0.3%) are modal weak, and the 0.5% (0.4%) are modal strong.
Figure 4 closes the summary statistics section of this paper. In this graph I tried to provide
an intuitive representation of the Conflict of Interest characteristics, both in terms of associated
coverage (the upper part of the graph and the correspondent right y axe metrics) and associated
sentiments (the below part of the graph and the correspondent left y axe metrics).
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
This graph shows the differences in terms of coverage’s quantity and quality between firms
suffering Conflict of Interest and firms not suffering Conflict of Interest. The dotted line in the upper
part is representing the share of articles suffering for Conflict of Interest, and its variation over
time.It reaches the maximum level in 2007, decreasing by almost 2 percentage point in 2008, and
then it stays stable on a medium level until 2011. The part below is instead representing the
differences in each tone average between in conflict firm and not in conflict firms10. First column of
each histogram is the Positive tone. From the graph it is difficult to see if there are any differences,
since all values seem very close to zero (i.e. the average value are the same for in conflict and
not in conflict firms). More clear is the representation of the Negative tone. Here the columns are
consistently for all the five years significantly negative, showing as on average for a firm being in
conflict is associated with a lower level of Negative tone. Similar is the situation for the extreme
right column, that associated with the level of Legal and Litigious tone, where firms suffering a
Conflict of Interest are associated on average with a lower value. More difficult to interpret is the
evolution for the Uncertainty tone, that seems to be always positive but significantly different than
zero only in the more recent years.
10A positive value of the histogram means the average is greater for in conflict firms than not in conflict ones.
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V. Correlation Tables
Before going to the proper results section, it would be interesting to analyze how the main variables
used in this empirical analysis are correlated each others. I am going to present hereafter three
tables that would be able to clearly identify interesting patterns and harmful pitfalls contained in
the dataset I created. This is particularly important since many of the measures I am using in this
empirical analysis are actually brand new and never computed before with this strategy, especially
taking in account the fact I am dealing with an almost not explored yet field of research like the
financial related text in Italian language.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The first table presented is about the sentiment indicators related variables. In this case I would
expect a very strong correlation between variables, as in the English language similar methodology.
Looking at the table it is possible to observe that the size of correlation is not as big as expected.
I obtained levels similar to those usually found in english text just for the correlation between
Uncertainty tone and Modal Weak tone. Still, since all correlation are always greater than 0.1 and
following previous studies, I decided not to use together this variables in order to be the most
precise possible.
The next two table are instead presenting the correlations between the main sentiment indicators
(Positive, Negative, Uncertainty, and Legal) and the five different newspapers we considered (Corriere
della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa, Il Giornale, Il Resto del Carlino) and the correlations between the
main sentiment indicators (Positive, Negative, Uncertainty, and Legal) and the five different years in
the sample (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
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V. Results
I. Conflict of interest and the quantity of the news
The main results of this paper is to prove two significant and positive relationship: (1) between
being a firm in Conflict of Interest and the quantity of coverage and (2) between being a firm in
Conflict of Interest and the quality of coverage. The direction of both the relationships is positive:
being in conflict produces a dimensional greater and a qualitatively better coverage. To prove this
relationship and the existence of a causal effect I develop a wide set of empirical analysis and I
am reporting here the most significant ones. First aim of this research was to investigate about
the effect of a coverage effect. In order to do that I collapsed all the observations from the articles
level to the firm-newspaper couple unit of analysis, counting how many articles and how many
words have been used in total for each couple (e.g. a couple is Fiat-La Stampa or Fiat-La Repubblica).
Results are reported in the table below. INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
The four regressions presented on the Table 5 coherently show a positive effect of being in Conflict
of Interest on the two measures of coverage I developed. This table is effective to respond to
research hypotheses H1, H1a, and H1b. All of the three found positive answers from the data
analysis, with both the specification of coverage and ownership measures I computed. Regression
(1) shows how the number of articles is positively and significantly influenced by in conflict. This
holds also controlling for newspaper fixed effect. On average being part of the ownership structure
of a publishing firm produces a coverage significantly greater that not being. The same holds even
if we consider as a measure of Conflict of Interest not only the simple dummy, but the ownership
share (in the table is indicated with Media Firm Share Owned). Furthermore and not surprising the
analysis performed using as coverage variable the total number of words instead of total number
of articles (a more precise measure indeed) returns the same results, even more robust. These
regressions are supporting in a very strong way all the hypotheses I made on the relationship
between coverage and the Conflict of Interest.
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II. Conflict of interest and the quality of the news
Probably the main point of this research is instead to look for a qualitative effect on the articles
published by newspapers regarding firms taking part in the ownership structure of the newspaper
itself - i.e. the firm suffering the Conflict of Interest. First attempt in the direction of answering this
question is provided in Table 8, with the simplest way possible: a t-test on the mean differences.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Table 8 reports the t-test between the two sub-sample: firms in conflict and firms not in conflict.
This test proves the differences between the mean of the Negative tone in the two subgroups is
statistical significant. Since the mean of the in conflict sub-sample is lower than the mean of the not
in conflict sub-sample, it is possible to argue that firms in conflict are associated significantly with
a lower level of Negative tone, i.e. with a qualitatively better coverage. I chose to present just the
result for the Negative tone in t-test form since the negative tone is the most common and usually
reliable sentiment indicator. Nevertheless to be able to argue about hypotheses confirmation is
better to look before at the complete model presented hereafter.
Next table is the first representation of the complete model discussed before. Firm specific and
newspaper specific fixed effects are taken in account, together with quarters fixed effects11
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
Results of Table 9 are the very core part of this research paper. In this table consistent, significant,
highly supported results are reported. Basing on a sample size of 127,190 observations, I find
confirmations for two out of three of the main research hypotheses and for the last one I have no
significant effect. The regressions, based on ordinary least squared estimators, show (1) a negative
and significant effect of being part of the ownership structure of the media firm on the Negative
tone (it supports hypotheses H3,H3a, H3b), (2) negative and significant effect of being part of
11In these regression models, as well as in all the others will be presented in the paper, only the quarter fixed effects
models are shown. Furthermore I obtained the same results using models with year fixed effects, models that I am omitting
for brevity.
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the ownership structure of the media firm on the uncertainty tone, (3) negative and significant
effect of being part of the ownership structure of the media firm on the Legal-Litigious tone, and
(4) negative and significant effect of being part of the ownership structure of the media firm on
the Modal Weak tone (the last three support hypotheses H4,H4a, H4b). At the contrary there is no
evidence supporting the hypotheses H2 (Positive tone has not significant impact) or H1 (there is
no evidence about coverage’s patterns, coverage here only measured as average number of words
per article).
Same results but even more significant are those reported in Table 10, in which the same
regression models are reported but with the continuous specification for the Conflict of Interest.
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE
Table 10 supports and strengthens the results of the previous table, when the Conflict of Interest is
computed as share of the publishing firm owned by the firm each article is about.The regressions,
based on ordinary least squared estimators, show (1) a negative and significant effect of being part
of the ownership structure of the media firm on the Negative tone (it supports hypotheses H3,H3a,
H3b), (2) negative and significant effect of being part of the ownership structure of the media
firm on the uncertainty tone, (3) negative and significant effect of being part of the ownership
structure of the media firm on the Legal-Litigious tone, and (4) negative and significant effect of
being part of the ownership structure of the media firm on the Modal Weak tone (the last three
support hypotheses H4,H4a, H4b). At the contrary there is no evidence supporting the hypotheses
H2 (Positive tone has again not significant impact) or H1 (there is no evidence about coverage’s
patterns12).
Something is important to consider in this research framework is the role of the little sample of
unlisted firms. Since it was impossible to consider all unlisted firms, I decide to consider all those
involved in any ways in at least one of the ownership structure of the publishing firm. What I
strongly want to avoid is to generate any sort of biases based on the fact these firms are not listed.
Furthermore is pretty interesting to understand is information published on daily newspaper has
a different value for listed and unlisted firms. First attempt to answer these question is in Table 11
and Table 12.
12Coverage is also here and in all the next regression models intended as number of words per article and not total
number of article or total number of words. The best specification for coverage in that provided in Table 7
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INSERT TABLE 11 HERE
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE
Also after controlling for the presence of unlisted firms, all the results above described for Table 9
and Table 10 hold. Magnitudes, sign, and significances of each effect remain the same. We find
little support to the effect of being unlisted on the quality of coverage. The little evidence that may
be obtained by the second table seem to suggest the unlisted effect as an opposite effect to the
Conflict of Interest one. A deeper analysis on the combined effect between being unlisted and being
in Conflict of Interest will be proposed in the Robustness Checks section, specifically in Table 17.
VI. Robustness Checks
I. TOBIT Specifications
The first check needed to be applied to these regression models derives from pure statistical
reasons. For all the Tone indicators we use variables that may vary from 0 to 1 by construction,
since they are basically the ratio of total number of tonal words on the total number of words in
each articles. In order to avoid mistakes or inconsistencies a TOBIT specification of the above
presented model is hereafter provided. The next two tables (Table 13 and Table 14) show the results
for a TOBIT-based specification of the main models, using both the Conflict of Interest dummy and
the Conflict of Interest continuous variable.
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE
INSERT TABLE 14 HERE
The different statistical specification does not change anything in my models. Even in Table 13
and Table 14 it is possible to appreciate significant and negative effects of the Conflict of Interest
variable on the Negative tone, as well as negative is the effect on all the uncertainty-related variables
(Uncertainty, Legal-Litigious, and Modal Weak). Also these models furthermore are supporting the
hypotheses H3, H3a, H3b, H4, H4a, and H4b and they are not able neither to support or to deny
hypotheses H2, H2a, and H2b, perfectly consistent with the previous OLS based models.
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II. Interaction Variables
In order to try to deeper analyze the ownership structure effects some models with interaction
variables are hereafter proposed. The first of them is that presented in Table 15 in which I am
going to analyze the combined effect of being in Conflict of Interest with each single newspaper, in
order to understand if being in conflict is more effective on a newspaper than on another.
INSERT TABLE 15 HERE
Results from this table are not very easy to be understood. From a side and for the first time
the coverage effect is confirmed at the article level, providing additional evidence in support
of hypotheses H1, H1a, and H1b. From the other side, instead, reading this table is not very
straightforward. All the tonal effects seem to loose significance, leaving it to the interactions
between themselves and the newspapers’ dummies. Hypotheses H2, H2a, H2b, H3, H3a, H3b, H4,
H4a, H4b are neither supported or denied by these models.
The second set of interaction variables based models considers the interaction between the
Conflict of Interest dummy with each year of the sample.
INSERT TABLE 16 HERE
Results of these models are confirming the effect of the Negative tone but they are not confirming
results related to the uncertainty-related tones. Here we may have some evidence in support of
hypotheses H2, H2a, and H2b and also to the coverage at the article level effect (in support of
hypotheses H1, H1a, and H1b). Not easy is to understand and to explaining the time and conflict
combined effect. The most informative regressions seem to be the number (3) having the Negative
and the the number (4) having the Uncertainty tone as dependent variable. Here the effect of time
on the Conflict of Interest seems to be in the direction of increasing the ownership effects in the first
years of the considered sample, especially in 2007 and 2008.
Last but maybe the most interesting of the regression taking in account for interactions is that
reported in Table 17, showing the results for the combined effects of being in Conflict of Interest and
being an unlisted firm.
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INSERT TABLE 17 HERE
Using this specification, all the model described before are still working. We have evidences in sup-
port of H3, H3a, H3b, H4, H4a, and H4b, those regarding the Negative and the Uncertainty-related
tones.More interesting is the effect of the interaction variable named Unlisted*Confl, especially in
the uncertainty-related models. There the interaction variable assumes significance with the same
sign as the main variable, leading to a strenght in the basic effect.
III. Propensity Score Matching
The last specification for our data analysis is totally different than the previous one. Here we
are considering a propensity score between treated (i.e. article in Conflict of Interest) and untreated
(articles not in Conflict of Interest) observations. I compute a propensity score basing on all the
variables I have in the dataset and then I am going to pick for each observation in the treated
sample the nearest possible neighbor in the untreated sample. In this way I formed a control
sample based only on statistical property that could be a very powerful check for the entire
research design of this paper. The propensity score matching is computed both taking in account
and not taking in account for unlisted characteristic. In Table 18 results are reported.
INSERT TABLE 18 HERE
Table 18, especially in the Spcification 2, is the result closest to confirm all the research hypotheses
of this paper. For the only time I also obtained a little but significant evidence in support of H2,
i.e. a positive effect of Conflict of Interest on Positive tone. More importantly, all the previous results
are confirmed in both the specifications. These models are indeed supporting the hypotheses H3,
H3a, H3b, H4, H4a, and H4b perfectly consistent with the previous OLS and TOBIT models.
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VII. Conclusions
Firms owning shares of media publishing firms receive a ”better treatment”. They receive more
coverage, especially when measured in terms of total number of articles per year or in the of total
space used for them (represented by the total number of words). They receive a better coverage
especially in terms of quality of coverage. For a firm in Conflict of Interest with the publishing firm
a fewer number of negative word is used - even when measure in percentage of total number of
word of each article - and also a fewer number of uncertainty related words is used. This paper’s
data and empirical analyses are strongly supporting the Conflict of Interest theory, for which a firm
owning a newspaper tries to maximize private benefits through obtaining more coverage than
comparable firms and, most importantly, better and qualitatively greater contents of the articles.
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VIII. Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Coverage per period. In this graph the total number of articles published on the five considered newspapers
about the sample firms is reported. Articles are aggregated by quarter and they refer to the totality of listed
Italian firms together with the unlisted firms involved in at least one of the ownership structures of the
publishing firms.
Figure 2: Media sentiments per period. In this graph the mean of each tone is reported by year. Each tone is the result of
the proportion of tonal words on the total number of words for each article.From the figure we may observe
how the average level of positiveness, negativeness, uncertainty, et cetera vary across time.
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Figure 3: Articles distribution for firms in conflict following the ownership share they own in publishing firm. On the
Y axe number of articles are reported as percentage of the total number of article in the sample I considered.
Table 1: Sample composition. Number of articles published by each newspaper for all the firm (both in conflict and not
in conflict firms). Showing only the firms that receive at least 100 articles on at least one newspaper.
FIRM Newspaper_name Total
Corriere della Sera La Repubblica La Stampa Il Giornale Il Resto del Carlino
A2A SPA 743 593 288 696 633 2,953
ACEA SPA 181 278 49 175 71 754
AEFFE SPA 26 56 14 22 111 229
ANSALDO STS SPA 90 347 89 205 128 859
ARKIMEDICA SPA 226 2 6 117 26 377
ARNOLDO MONDADORI EDI 327 469 285 416 78 1,159
ASSICURAZIONI GENERAL 860 1,002 658 773 546 3,839
ASTALDI SPA 66 158 31 57 110 422
ATLANTIA SPA 424 377 152 302 909 2,164
AUTOGRILL SPA 192 110 36 182 62 582
BANCA CARIGE SPA 24 180 28 345 20 597
BANCA GENERALI SPA 16 274 14 40 61 405
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 336 406 186 317 216 1,461
BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO 474 309 233 543 249 1,808
BANCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA 79 54 30 88 187 438
BANCO POPOLARE 692 326 249 340 191 1,798
BEGHELLI SPA 12 87 8 16 394 517
BENETTON GROUP SPA 482 579 276 505 936 2,778
BREMBO SPA - FRENI BR 129 109 72 94 101 505
CALTAGIRONE SPA 117 111 76 86 15 405
CIR SPA - COMPAGNIE INDUSTRIALI RIUNITE I 244 676 206 362 170 1,658
CNH 154 163 3 169 220 709
COFIDE - GRUPPO DE BE 127 238 115 172 116 768
CREDITO EMILIANO 44 114 25 46 207 436
DIASORIN SPA 48 166 37 26 40 317
EDISON SPA 320 281 187 252 373 1,413
ENEL GREEN POWER SPA 90 101 73 67 152 483
ENEL SPA 796 1,005 633 779 1,041 4,254
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Sample composition. Number of articles published by each newspaper for all the firm (both in conflict and not
in conflict firms). Showing only the firms that receive at least 100 articles on at least one newspaper.
FIRM Newspaper_name Total
Corriere della Sera La Repubblica La Stampa Il Giornale Il Resto del Carlino
ENI SPA 1,036 1,039 703 780 563 4,121
ERG SPA 37 151 59 94 128 469
EXOR SPA 389 195 256 238 91 1,169
FIAT INDUSTRIAL SPA 113 113 182 75 155 638
FIAT SPA 2,351 3,372 2,789 2,222 2,229 12,963
FIERA MILANO SPA 204 242 46 301 231 1,024
FINMECCANICA SPA 469 794 288 590 249 2,390
FONDIARIA - SAI SPA 534 988 542 564 579 3,207
GEMINA SPA - GENERALE 169 259 98 229 92 847
GEOX SPA 59 124 49 130 38 400
GREENVISION AMBIENTE 239 5 9 214 61 528
GRUPPO EDITORIALE L’ESPRESSO 70 358 86 149 23 686
GIULIO EINAUDI EDITORE 3 21 14 109 2 149
HERA SPA 34 230 29 49 2,044 2,386
IMMSI SPA 73 89 63 88 206 519
IMPREGILO SPA 335 893 289 330 360 2,207
INDESIT COMPANY SPA 56 105 25 45 120 351
INTEK SPA 3 6 2 221 2 234
INTERPUMP GROUP SPA 17 15 6 116 79 233
INTESA SANPAOLO SPA 1,180 1,340 901 1,090 893 5,404
IREN SPA 37 264 88 103 48 540
ITALCEMENTI SPA FABBR 308 396 244 283 294 1,525
ITALMOBILIARE SPA 329 403 255 297 298 1,582
LOTTOMATICA GROUP SPA 108 192 0 297 46 643
LUXOTTICA GROUP SPA 403 554 252 238 327 1,774
MARR SPA 8 28 6 20 128 190
MEDIASET SPA 1,062 1,824 1,282 852 756 5,776
MEDIOBANCA SPA 1,417 2,486 2,328 2,774 1,578 10,583
MEDIOLANUM SPA 175 308 249 638 137 1,507
MERIDIANA FLY SPA 54 236 66 170 84 610
MILANO ASSICURAZIONI 117 130 136 150 96 629
MITTEL SPA 450 208 244 56 8 966
MONRIF SPA 4 10 6 6 397 423
MEDUSA FILM 19 11 8 703 0 741
OLIDATA SPA 4 24 10 6 156 200
PARMALAT SPA 988 1,298 1,014 566 568 4,434
PIAGGIO & C. SPA 230 432 262 368 486 1,778
PININFARINA SPA 232 822 490 188 144 1,876
PIRELLI & C. SPA 541 1,924 1,650 1,272 1,258 6,645
POLIGRAFICI EDITORIAL 16 14 10 12 594 646
POLTRONA FRAU SPA 102 60 66 52 172 452
PREMAFIN FINANZIARIA 147 344 306 266 212 1,275
PRYSMIAN SPA 278 400 346 196 446 1,666
RCS MEDIAGROUP SPA 583 290 295 293 126 1,004
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Sample composition. Number of articles published by each newspaper for all the firm (both in conflict and not
in conflict firms). Showing only the firms that receive at least 100 articles on at least one newspaper.
FIRM Newspaper_name Total
Corriere della Sera La Repubblica La Stampa Il Giornale Il Resto del Carlino
SORGENIA SPA 73 138 34 65 72 382
TERNA SPA 240 441 243 173 342 1,439
TISCALI SPA 85 146 130 160 53 574
TOD’S SPA 453 370 171 68 130 1,192
TREVI - FINANZIARIA I 29 62 16 35 168 310
UBS FIDUCIARIA SPA 198 165 138 128 80 709
UNICREDIT SPA 1,133 1,489 1,322 1,095 911 5,950
UNIPOL GRUPPO FINANZIARIO SPA 302 671 431 335 604 2,343
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Figure 4: Quantity and quality of coverage differences in conflict firms and not in conflict firms receive. The dotted
line represents the percentage of articles published every year referred to in conflict firms. The histograms in
the bottom part are representing the differences in the average sentiment between in conflict firms and not
in conflict firms (every year). The first column in each histogram is the positive tone, the second the negative
tone, the third the uncertainty tone, and the last one the legal tone. If a column has positive height, it means
the average tone is greater for in conflict firms than not in conflict firms. If the height is negative, it is true
the opposite. The most evident pattern here are those related to the negative and the legal tone: for both of
them in conflict firms have on average significantly lower average levels.
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Table 2: Coverage and media ownership. Descriptive statistics.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL
Corriere della Sera
Articles in Conflict 2,653 1,519 1,698 1,970 2,050 9,890
Total Articles 6,110 3,998 4,165 5,117 5,729 25,119
Conflict Dimension 43.42% 37.99% 40.77% 38.50% 35.78% 39.37%
La Repubblica
Articles in Conflict 226 308 332 230 285 1,381
Total Articles 7,314 6,985 6,535 6,200 5,697 32,731
Conflict Dimension 3.09% 4.41% 5.08% 3.71% 5.00% 4.22%
La Stampa
Articles in Conflict 1,182 692 954 859 930 4,617
Total Articles 4,737 3,652 3,943 3,724 4,306 20,362
Conflict Dimension 24.95% 18.95% 24.19% 23.07% 21.60% 22.67%
Il Giornale
Articles in Conflict 818 673 720 670 473 3,354
Total Articles 5,692 4,389 5,014 5,140 3,893 24,128
Conflict Dimension 14.37% 15.33% 14.36% 13.04% 12.15% 13.90%
Il Resto del Carlino
Articles in Conflict 179 112 136 196 174 797
Total Articles 6,316 3,931 3,996 4,864 5,743 24,850
Conflict Dimension 2.83% 2.85% 3.40% 4.03% 3.03% 3.21%
All Newspapers
Articles in Conflict 5,058 3,304 3,840 3,925 3,912 20,039
Total Articles 30,169 22,955 23,653 25,045 25,368 127,190
Conflict Dimension 16.77% 14.39% 16.23% 15.67% 15.42% 15.76%
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Table 3: Summary statistics. Sample coverage: quantity and quality. For all the sample summary statistics are
reported.Panel A reports the average, the standard deviation, minimum and maximum value, and media for
both the quantity of coverage (Words) and quality of coverage (Positive, Negative, Uncertainty, Legal, Modal
Weak, and Modal Strong tones). Quantity of coverage unit of measure is thousand of words. Quality of
coverage unit of measure is percentage points representing the proportion of each category tonal words on the
total number of words for each article. Panel B is instead reporting the proportion of articles published on each
of the five considered newspaper, while Panel C is reporting the proportion of articles published on each of the
five considered year.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P50
PANEL A Quantity and quality of coverage
Words (1,000) 127190 .344 .247 .023 4.719 .265
Positive (%) 127190 .017 .013 -.009 .184 .014
Negative (%) 127190 .022 .015 -.015 .319 .02
Uncertainty (%) 127190 .011 .009 0 .243 .01
Legal (%) 127190 .013 .012 0 .193 .01
Modal_Weak (%) 127190 .004 .005 0 .204 .003
Modal_Strong (%) 127190 .005 .005 0 .106 .004
PANEL B Coverage by newspaper
Newspaper Obs Proportion
CorriereDellaSera 127190 .188
LaRepubblica 127190 .261
LaStampa 127190 .169
IlGiornale 127190 .189
IlRestoDelCarlino 127190 .193
PANEL C Coverage by year
Year Obs Proportion
2007 127190 .237
2008 127190 .181
2009 127190 .182
2010 127190 .197
2011 127190 .203
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Table 4: Correlation matrix table. All the indicators of quality and quantity of coverage are taken in account.
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Words 1
Positive -0.1264 1
Negative -0.0367 0.0192 1
Uncertainty 0.2008 -0.1072 0.0681 1
Legal -0.1166 -0.1205 0.2109 0.1128 1
Modal_Weak 0.2121 -0.1308 0.0026 0.6847 0.0055 1
Modal_Strong 0.2002 0.0741 0.062 0.147 -0.071 0.1412 1
Table 5: Correlation matrix table. Correlations between all the indicators of quality and quantity of coverage and all the
newspapers examined.
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal
Corriere Della Sera 0.1013 -0.019 -0.03 0.0966 -0.0515
La Repubblica 0.0734 0.005 0.0736 -0.0273 -0.1162
La Stampa 0.0321 0.0734 0.0388 -0.0325 -0.0764
Il Giornale -0.0542 -0.0321 -0.0866 0.0022 0.1271
Il Resto Del Carlino -0.1588 -0.0245 -0.003 -0.0365 0.1266
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Table 6: Correlation matrix table. Correlations between all the indicators of quality and quantity of coverage and all the
years in which the examined articles are published.
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal
2007 0.0596 -0.0355 -0.0415 0.0573 -0.0144
2008 -0.0129 -0.005 0.0278 0.0152 0.0004
2009 -0.0424 0.0181 0.015 -0.0166 0.0091
2010 -0.0263 0.0163 -0.024 -0.0375 -0.0014
2011 0.016 0.0089 0.0266 -0.022 0.0074
Table 7: Regression model explaing coverage as defined as total number of articles and total number of words.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N_Articles N_Articles Total_Words Total_Words
Related parts firms dummy 559.4∗∗∗ 245526.9∗∗∗
(96.22) (102.25)
Media Firm Share Owned 1032.1∗∗∗ 456013.9∗∗∗
(98.06) (104.98)
Corriere della Sera -160.9∗∗∗ 15.01∗∗ 16853.1∗∗∗ 93989.0∗∗∗
(-24.32) (2.39) (6.17) (36.31)
La Repubblica 219.6∗∗∗ 224.2∗∗∗ 170815.0∗∗∗ 172817.0∗∗∗
(37.24) (38.06) (70.12) (71.09)
La Stampa 12.88∗ -7.830 74935.7∗∗∗ 65469.1∗∗∗
(1.92) (-1.16) (26.98) (23.50)
Il Giornale -106.7∗∗∗ -52.88∗∗∗ 3410.5 27008.1∗∗∗
(-16.75) (-8.35) (1.30) (10.34)
Constant 629.0∗∗∗ 619.3∗∗∗ 168253.9∗∗∗ 163900.1∗∗∗
(141.32) (139.16) (91.52) (89.24)
Observations 127432 127432 127432 127432
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Two-sample t test with equal variances: Negative Tone
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95 % Conf. Interval
Not in Conflict 107358 0.0226444 0.0000478 0.0156767 0.0225507 0.0227382
In Conflict 20074 0.0204674 0.0000973 0.0137907 0.0202766 0.0206582
combined 127432 0.0223015 0.0000432 0.0154153 0.0222169 0.0223861
diff 0.0021771 0.0001184 0.001945 0.0024091
diff = mean(0) - mean(1) t = 18.3902
Ho: diff = 0 Degrees of freedom = 127430
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
Table 9: Regression table: OLS regressions with Conflict of interest as a dummy. Newspapers, Firms, and Quarters
fixed effects considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Related parts firms dummy 0.242 -0.000124 -0.00245∗∗∗ -0.000260∗∗∗ -0.000617∗∗∗ -0.0000899∗ 0.0000103
(0.10) (-0.94) (-15.61) (-2.80) (-5.15) (-1.75) (0.20)
Corriere della Sera 120.9∗∗∗ 0.000289∗∗ -0.000549∗∗∗ 0.00237∗∗∗ -0.00484∗∗∗ 0.00149∗∗∗ 0.000619∗∗∗
(49.76) (2.28) (-3.62) (26.42) (-41.77) (29.94) (12.45)
La Repubblica 109.0∗∗∗ 0.000505∗∗∗ 0.00113∗∗∗ 0.0000653 -0.00607∗∗∗ 0.000404∗∗∗ 0.000278∗∗∗
(51.67) (4.59) (8.60) (0.84) (-60.29) (9.36) (6.44)
La Stampa 90.43∗∗∗ 0.00236∗∗∗ 0.000385∗∗ -0.000391∗∗∗ -0.00575∗∗∗ 0.000197∗∗∗ -0.000423∗∗∗
(37.27) (18.64) (2.54) (-4.37) (-49.71) (3.98) (-8.53)
Il Giornale 37.07∗∗∗ -0.000126 -0.00292∗∗∗ 0.000621∗∗∗ -0.0000198 0.000207∗∗∗ -0.000369∗∗∗
(16.07) (-1.04) (-20.26) (7.30) (-0.18) (4.40) (-7.81)
Constant 321.1∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.00526∗∗∗ 0.00517∗∗∗
(40.99) (37.58) (51.46) (49.35) (43.43) (32.85) (32.24)
Quarters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Regression table: OLS regressions with conflict of interest measured as the proportion of share owned.
Newspapers, Firms, and Quarters fixed effects considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Media Firm Share Owned -6.392 0.0000359 -0.00463∗∗∗ -0.000808∗∗∗ -0.000747∗∗∗ -0.000517∗∗∗ 0.0000393
(-1.43) (0.15) (-16.59) (-4.90) (-3.50) (-5.66) (0.43)
Corriere della Sera 121.3∗∗∗ 0.000243∗∗ -0.00124∗∗∗ 0.00231∗∗∗ -0.00503∗∗∗ 0.00148∗∗∗ 0.000621∗∗∗
(53.70) (2.06) (-8.80) (27.72) (-46.73) (32.00) (13.44)
La Repubblica 109.1∗∗∗ 0.000502∗∗∗ 0.00116∗∗∗ 0.0000738 -0.00607∗∗∗ 0.000411∗∗∗ 0.000278∗∗∗
(51.70) (4.56) (8.83) (0.95) (-60.26) (9.52) (6.43)
La Stampa 91.37∗∗∗ 0.00234∗∗∗ 0.000764∗∗∗ -0.000306∗∗∗ -0.00572∗∗∗ 0.000261∗∗∗ -0.000428∗∗∗
(36.67) (18.00) (4.92) (-3.33) (-48.10) (5.11) (-8.39)
Il Giornale 37.17∗∗∗ -0.000134 -0.00301∗∗∗ 0.000615∗∗∗ -0.0000486 0.000208∗∗∗ -0.000369∗∗∗
(16.15) (-1.11) (-20.95) (7.24) (-0.44) (4.43) (-7.82)
Constant 320.5∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00518∗∗∗
(42.66) (38.91) (47.59) (50.21) (43.43) (33.28) (33.71)
Quarters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Regression table: OLS regressions with Conflict of interest as a dummy, including also the unlisted firm
dummy variable.. Newspapers, Firms, and Quarters fixed effects considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Related parts firms dummy 0.242 -0.000124 -0.00245∗∗∗ -0.000260∗∗∗ -0.000617∗∗∗ -0.0000899∗ 0.0000103
(0.10) (-0.94) (-15.61) (-2.80) (-5.15) (-1.75) (0.20)
Unlisted -90.68∗∗∗ -0.00339∗ 0.00161 -0.000602 0.000565 0.000733 0.000975
(-2.71) (-1.94) (0.77) (-0.49) (0.35) (1.07) (1.42)
Corriere della Sera 120.9∗∗∗ 0.000289∗∗ -0.000549∗∗∗ 0.00237∗∗∗ -0.00484∗∗∗ 0.00149∗∗∗ 0.000619∗∗∗
(49.76) (2.28) (-3.62) (26.42) (-41.77) (29.94) (12.45)
La Repubblica 109.0∗∗∗ 0.000505∗∗∗ 0.00113∗∗∗ 0.0000653 -0.00607∗∗∗ 0.000404∗∗∗ 0.000278∗∗∗
(51.67) (4.59) (8.60) (0.84) (-60.29) (9.36) (6.44)
La Stampa 90.43∗∗∗ 0.00236∗∗∗ 0.000385∗∗ -0.000391∗∗∗ -0.00575∗∗∗ 0.000197∗∗∗ -0.000423∗∗∗
(37.27) (18.64) (2.54) (-4.37) (-49.71) (3.98) (-8.53)
Il Giornale 37.07∗∗∗ -0.000126 -0.00292∗∗∗ 0.000621∗∗∗ -0.0000198 0.000207∗∗∗ -0.000369∗∗∗
(16.07) (-1.04) (-20.26) (7.30) (-0.18) (4.40) (-7.81)
Constant 321.1∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.00526∗∗∗ 0.00517∗∗∗
(40.99) (37.58) (51.46) (49.35) (43.43) (32.85) (32.24)
Quarters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Regression table: OLS regressions with Conflict of interest as a dummy, including also the unlisted firm
dummy variable. Newspapers, Firms, and Quarters fixed effects considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Media Firm Share Owned -6.392 0.0000359 -0.00463∗∗∗ -0.000808∗∗∗ -0.000747∗∗∗ -0.000517∗∗∗ 0.0000393
(-1.43) (0.15) (-16.59) (-4.90) (-3.50) (-5.66) (0.43)
Unlisted -87.35∗∗∗ -0.00339∗ 0.00443∗∗ -0.000136 0.00105 0.00102 0.000953
(-2.60) (-1.93) (2.11) (-0.11) (0.66) (1.48) (1.39)
Corriere della Sera 121.3∗∗∗ 0.000243∗∗ -0.00124∗∗∗ 0.00231∗∗∗ -0.00503∗∗∗ 0.00148∗∗∗ 0.000621∗∗∗
(53.70) (2.06) (-8.80) (27.72) (-46.73) (32.00) (13.44)
La Repubblica 109.1∗∗∗ 0.000502∗∗∗ 0.00116∗∗∗ 0.0000738 -0.00607∗∗∗ 0.000411∗∗∗ 0.000278∗∗∗
(51.70) (4.56) (8.83) (0.95) (-60.26) (9.52) (6.43)
La Stampa 91.37∗∗∗ 0.00234∗∗∗ 0.000764∗∗∗ -0.000306∗∗∗ -0.00572∗∗∗ 0.000261∗∗∗ -0.000428∗∗∗
(36.67) (18.00) (4.92) (-3.33) (-48.10) (5.11) (-8.39)
Il Giornale 37.17∗∗∗ -0.000134 -0.00301∗∗∗ 0.000615∗∗∗ -0.0000486 0.000208∗∗∗ -0.000369∗∗∗
(16.15) (-1.11) (-20.95) (7.24) (-0.44) (4.43) (-7.82)
Constant 320.5∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00518∗∗∗
(42.66) (38.91) (47.59) (50.21) (43.43) (33.28) (33.71)
Quarters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Robusteness checks. TOBIT regressions with Conflict of interest as a dummy, including also the unlisted
firm dummy variable. Newspapers, Firms, and Years fixed effects considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Related parts firms dummy -0.000134 -0.00270∗∗∗ -0.000346∗∗∗ -0.000652∗∗∗ -0.000149∗ -0.0000156
(-0.95) (-15.96) (-3.07) (-4.98) (-1.75) (-0.20)
Corriere della Sera 0.000468∗∗∗ -0.000127 0.00295∗∗∗ -0.00589∗∗∗ 0.00268∗∗∗ 0.00132∗∗∗
(3.42) (-0.78) (26.95) (-46.72) (32.15) (17.42)
La Repubblica 0.000832∗∗∗ 0.00124∗∗∗ -0.0000143 -0.00740∗∗∗ 0.000871∗∗∗ 0.000658∗∗∗
(6.99) (8.69) (-0.15) (-67.50) (11.86) (9.92)
La Stampa 0.00281∗∗∗ 0.000761∗∗∗ -0.000408∗∗∗ -0.00674∗∗∗ 0.000563∗∗∗ -0.000349∗∗∗
(20.56) (4.66) (-3.72) (-53.52) (6.67) (-4.56)
Il Giornale 0.0000996 -0.00359∗∗∗ 0.000412∗∗∗ -0.0000377 0.000256∗∗∗ -0.000668∗∗∗
(0.77) (-22.95) (3.94) (-0.32) (3.18) (-9.12)
Constant 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.00370∗∗∗ 0.00386∗∗∗
(33.28) (47.63) (39.52) (40.27) (14.04) (15.81)
sigma
Constant 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.00751∗∗∗ 0.00700∗∗∗
(474.13) (472.59) (430.21) (471.32) (345.85) (367.39)
Years Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Robusteness checks. TOBIT regressions with conflict of interest measured as the proportion of share owned.
Newspapers, Firms, and Years fixed effects considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Media Firm Share Owned 0.0000102 -0.00518∗∗∗ -0.000994∗∗∗ -0.00103∗∗∗ -0.000769∗∗∗ -0.0000105
(0.04) (-17.19) (-4.94) (-4.42) (-5.07) (-0.08)
Corriere della Sera 0.000419∗∗∗ -0.000889∗∗∗ 0.00286∗∗∗ -0.00609∗∗∗ 0.00266∗∗∗ 0.00132∗∗∗
(3.29) (-5.84) (28.19) (-51.95) (34.37) (18.67)
La Repubblica 0.000829∗∗∗ 0.00127∗∗∗ -0.00000452 -0.00739∗∗∗ 0.000881∗∗∗ 0.000658∗∗∗
(6.97) (8.93) (-0.05) (-67.43) (11.99) (9.91)
La Stampa 0.00279∗∗∗ 0.00119∗∗∗ -0.000306∗∗∗ -0.00667∗∗∗ 0.000659∗∗∗ -0.000350∗∗∗
(19.90) (7.08) (-2.71) (-51.56) (7.59) (-4.44)
Il Giornale 0.0000911 -0.00369∗∗∗ 0.000403∗∗∗ -0.0000647 0.000256∗∗∗ -0.000669∗∗∗
(0.70) (-23.66) (3.87) (-0.55) (3.19) (-9.15)
Constant 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.00346∗∗∗ 0.00384∗∗∗
(34.42) (43.44) (39.88) (40.12) (13.69) (16.39)
sigma
Constant 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.00751∗∗∗ 0.00700∗∗∗
(474.13) (472.59) (430.21) (471.33) (345.85) (367.39)
Years Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 15: Regression table regressions with interaction variable between conflict of interest dummy and newspaper
dummies. Conflict of interest measured as the proportion of share owned. Newspapers, Firms, and Year fixed
effects considered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Related parts firms dummy 44.35∗∗∗ -0.000199 0.000458 -0.000411 0.000298 -0.000112 -0.0000586
(2.76) (-0.24) (0.46) (-0.69) (0.39) (-0.34) (-0.18)
Corriere della Sera 125.4∗∗∗ 0.000477∗∗∗ -0.000776∗∗∗ 0.00231∗∗∗ -0.00512∗∗∗ 0.00144∗∗∗ 0.000731∗∗∗
(47.94) (3.49) (-4.75) (23.95) (-41.00) (26.80) (13.65)
La Repubblica 34.56∗ 0.00169∗ -0.00320∗∗∗ 0.000726 -0.00637∗∗∗ 0.000272 0.000617∗
(1.91) (1.79) (-2.84) (1.09) (-7.39) (0.73) (1.67)
La Stampa 51.47∗∗∗ 0.00258∗∗∗ -0.00345∗∗∗ -0.000308 -0.00606∗∗∗ -0.0000575 -0.000302
(3.07) (2.95) (-3.29) (-0.50) (-7.58) (-0.17) (-0.88)
Il Giornale 31.34∗ 0.000340 -0.00577∗∗∗ 0.000282 -0.00421∗∗∗ 0.000355 0.000342
(1.82) (0.38) (-5.36) (0.44) (-5.12) (1.00) (0.97)
Newspaper=1 × Related parts firms dummy=1 -54.66∗∗∗ -0.000320 -0.00235∗∗ 0.000283 -0.000219 0.000160 -0.000231
(-3.34) (-0.38) (-2.30) (0.47) (-0.28) (0.48) (-0.69)
Newspaper=2 × Related parts firms dummy=0 76.24∗∗∗ -0.00119 0.00438∗∗∗ -0.000687 0.000229 0.000136 -0.000345
(4.20) (-1.26) (3.86) (-1.02) (0.26) (0.37) (-0.93)
Newspaper=3 × Related parts firms dummy=0 38.88∗∗ -0.000209 0.00401∗∗∗ -0.0000684 0.000147 0.000314 -0.000130
(2.30) (-0.24) (3.79) (-0.11) (0.18) (0.91) (-0.38)
Newspaper=4 × Related parts firms dummy=0 2.910 -0.000453 0.00283∗∗∗ 0.000379 0.00443∗∗∗ -0.000157 -0.000767∗∗
(0.17) (-0.50) (2.60) (0.59) (5.34) (-0.44) (-2.16)
Constant 311.7∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.00549∗∗∗ 0.00513∗∗∗
(36.88) (34.56) (49.27) (45.28) (38.54) (31.73) (29.64)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Regression table regressions with interaction variable between conflict of interest dummy and years dummies.
Conflict of interest measured as the proportion of share owned. Newspapers, Firms, and Year fixed effects
considered
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Related parts firms dummy 32.49∗∗∗ 0.000358 -0.00177∗∗∗ 0.000136 0.000277 -0.0000552 0.000230∗∗
(7.29) (1.54) (-6.37) (0.83) (1.30) (-0.60) (2.52)
Corriere della Sera 120.4∗∗∗ 0.000318∗∗ -0.000584∗∗∗ 0.00236∗∗∗ -0.00486∗∗∗ 0.00148∗∗∗ 0.000610∗∗∗
(49.58) (2.51) (-3.85) (26.31) (-41.91) (29.84) (12.26)
La Repubblica 108.4∗∗∗ 0.000519∗∗∗ 0.00110∗∗∗ 0.0000529 -0.00612∗∗∗ 0.000401∗∗∗ 0.000270∗∗∗
(51.42) (4.71) (8.34) (0.68) (-60.73) (9.28) (6.25)
La Stampa 90.04∗∗∗ 0.00239∗∗∗ 0.000352∗∗ -0.000392∗∗∗ -0.00579∗∗∗ 0.000200∗∗∗ -0.000430∗∗∗
(37.13) (18.82) (2.32) (-4.38) (-49.98) (4.03) (-8.66)
Il Giornale 36.85∗∗∗ -0.0000964 -0.00295∗∗∗ 0.000621∗∗∗ -0.0000521 0.000207∗∗∗ -0.000377∗∗∗
(15.99) (-0.80) (-20.48) (7.29) (-0.47) (4.38) (-7.98)
Year=2007 × Related parts firms dummy=1 -51.89∗∗∗ -0.000687∗∗ -0.00174∗∗∗ -0.00112∗∗∗ -0.00153∗∗∗ -0.0000870 -0.000387∗∗∗
(-9.33) (-2.37) (-5.02) (-5.46) (-5.76) (-0.76) (-3.40)
Year=2008 × Related parts firms dummy=1 -56.40∗∗∗ -0.000406 -0.00145∗∗∗ -0.000484∗∗ -0.00140∗∗∗ -0.00000603 -0.000479∗∗∗
(-9.23) (-1.27) (-3.78) (-2.14) (-4.79) (-0.05) (-3.83)
Year=2009 × Related parts firms dummy=1 -46.58∗∗∗ -0.000932∗∗∗ 0.0000238 -0.000339 -0.000619∗∗ -0.000155 -0.000206∗
(-7.92) (-3.03) (0.06) (-1.56) (-2.20) (-1.29) (-1.71)
Year=2010 × Related parts firms dummy=1 -4.403 -0.000345 -0.0000574 0.000221 -0.000784∗∗∗ 0.000132 -0.00000661
(-0.75) (-1.13) (-0.16) (1.03) (-2.81) (1.10) (-0.06)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 319.3∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.00520∗∗∗ 0.00520∗∗∗
(42.61) (39.39) (53.87) (51.02) (45.47) (33.90) (33.89)
Years Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Regression table regressions with interaction variable between conflict of interest dummy and unlisted
dummy. Conflict of interest measured as the proportion of share owned. Newspapers, Firms, and Year fixed
effects considered
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Words Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Media Firm Share Owned -5.217 -0.0000475 -0.00464∗∗∗ -0.000745∗∗∗ -0.000497∗∗ -0.000510∗∗∗ 0.0000232
(-1.15) (-0.20) (-16.41) (-4.46) (-2.30) (-5.51) (0.25)
Unlisted -76.07∗∗ -0.00419∗∗ 0.00435∗∗ 0.000468 0.00346∗∗ 0.00109 0.000799
(-2.22) (-2.34) (2.03) (0.37) (2.11) (1.55) (1.14)
Unlisted*Confl -15.09 0.00107∗∗ 0.000109 -0.000808∗∗ -0.00322∗∗∗ -0.0000912 0.000206
(-1.62) (2.20) (0.19) (-2.35) (-7.24) (-0.48) (1.08)
Corriere della Sera 121.3∗∗∗ 0.000239∗∗ -0.00124∗∗∗ 0.00231∗∗∗ -0.00502∗∗∗ 0.00148∗∗∗ 0.000621∗∗∗
(53.72) (2.02) (-8.80) (27.75) (-46.62) (32.00) (13.42)
La Repubblica 109.1∗∗∗ 0.000506∗∗∗ 0.00116∗∗∗ 0.0000706 -0.00608∗∗∗ 0.000411∗∗∗ 0.000279∗∗∗
(51.66) (4.60) (8.83) (0.91) (-60.38) (9.51) (6.45)
La Stampa 91.22∗∗∗ 0.00235∗∗∗ 0.000765∗∗∗ -0.000314∗∗∗ -0.00575∗∗∗ 0.000260∗∗∗ -0.000426∗∗∗
(36.58) (18.07) (4.92) (-3.41) (-48.35) (5.09) (-8.34)
Il Giornale 37.52∗∗∗ -0.000159 -0.00301∗∗∗ 0.000634∗∗∗ 0.0000261 0.000211∗∗∗ -0.000373∗∗∗
(16.23) (-1.31) (-20.88) (7.43) (0.24) (4.45) (-7.89)
Constant 320.7∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00518∗∗∗
(42.68) (38.88) (47.58) (50.24) (43.52) (33.28) (33.70)
Querter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Regression table: propensity score matching based estimation. Propensity score is computed basing on the
number of words of each article, the listed/unlisted status of the firm, and the newspaper publishing the article
itself. I then apply the nearest neighbor matching method to compare the treated sample (articles regarding
related parts) and the control one.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive Negative Uncertainty Legal Modal_Weak Modal_Strong
Specification 1 - Propensity Score without taking in account for listing patterns
Related parts firms dummy 0.000175 -0.00163∗∗∗ -0.000770∗∗∗ -0.00130∗∗∗ -0.000187∗∗∗ 0.000130∗∗∗
(1.43) (-13.11) (-9.37) (-10.65) (-3.60) (2.80)
Specification 2 - Propensity Score taking in account for listing patterns
Related parts firms dummy 0.000221∗ -0.00117∗∗∗ -0.000694∗∗∗ -0.00102∗∗∗ -0.000208∗∗∗ 0.000140∗∗
(1.94) (-8.19) (-6.76) (-8.51) (-3.56) (2.39)
Observations 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190 127190
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Media sentiment and the pricing of IPOs
Carlo Raimondo∗ Emanuele Bajo†
Abstract
We study a sample of 3.061 IPOs in the US stock markets in the period between 1995 and 2013 and the
related coverage and tone from the New York Times. Based on 20.648 articles collected from one year
before the filing to the IPO date we document that NYT coverage positively influences both underpricing
and price revision. Likewise, applying a sentiment analysis based on financial word lists, we show how
the tone of news also drives part of the first day returns and price revisions. Our results are consistent
with a view in which more covered and positively reported IPOs are preferred by investors generating
an increase on the demand side. These results hold after controlling for common underpricing and price
revision economic rationales and also considering the informational effect of S-1 content disclosure.
I. Introduction
The pricing of IPOs as well as the price behavior during the first day of trade has beenwidely investigated phenomenon since Ibbotson 1975 (Ibbotson 1975). The informationasymmetry between the issuer and the underwriter on the one side and the investors on
the other side is the main rationale for the existence of the underpricing and for the practice of
the bookbuilding. In a setting with no information asymmetry professional investors would not
be able to profit at the expense of retail investors. Hence, a fairly priced IPO would produce no
underpricing, no disparity among market participants and no market failure. Along this line,
the wide use of bookbuilding, as a technique for underwriters to enhance the price discovery,
confirms the pivotal role of the information in the IPO process. According to Hanley and Wilhelm,
Cornelli and Goldreich, and Aggarwal et al. (Hanley and Wilhelm Jr 1995; Cornelli and Goldreich
2001; Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri 2002) underwriters are willing to underprice the IPO shares
in order to reward institutional investors from revealing their evaluation of the offered shares.
Clearly, in a informative efficient market, the bookbuilding would have no reason to exist.
As suggested, the IPO pricing literature is deeply rooted with the role of information asymmetry.
However, quite surprisingly-to the best of our knowledge-past research has devoted little attention
∗PhD Student, University of Bologna, Department of Management, Via Capo di lucca 34, 40126 Bologna, Italy.
Corresponding author: carlo.raimondo@unibo.it.
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to the relationship between the media information production and the IPO valuation. More
precisely, with the sole exception of Liu et al. (Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014a), who investigate
the effect of media coverage on the level of underpricing, no other study analyzes the role of
media as an avenue to mitigate the information problem. Instead, in this paper we show that both
the coverage (information volume) and the tone of the articles (sentiment) are able to significantly
affect the information dissemination and in turn the level of price revision and underpricing.
This study follows an increasing stream of literature (Tetlock 2007; Tetlock 2011; Bhattacharya
et al. 2009; Dougal et al. 2012; Garcia 2013; Pollock and Rindova 2003; Pollock, Rindova, and
Maggitti 2008) that looks at the relationship between media and finance. Likewise, we aim at
investigating the role played by newspaper financial reporting in the big ”IPO game”. We restrict
the analysis to the role of printed newspaper because, differently than other media, space is very
limited and valuable. Rationing in space directly leads to rationing in news coverage making
it more visible the information reported. Following the idea that too much information is no
information, having a limited available space forces the newspaper to select and report the most
informative events. From the reader perspective, having a definitive set of news allows her to
process the information content. This effect is obviously greater, ceteris paribus, in increasing
the newspaper specific reputation and the horizon of the interest of the newspaper itself, and in
decreasing of total space availability on the newspaper.
We analyze the news coverage and tone from the New York Times (NYT), as in Garcia (2013)
(Garcia 2013), for 3,061 U.S. IPOs in the period 1995-2013. For each new issue we consider any
news published in the NYT in the time span ranging from one year before to the trade date. This
procedure allows us to collect and examine 20,648 news articles. The most desirable feature of
NYT is its audience discrimination, that is the self-selective mechanism which leads the readers to
belong to a very broad social group. In this meaning we are more interested in measuring the
information flow towards the general public or retail (mass) investors rather than focusing on the
specialized sectorial information directed to professionals (institutional investors). The difference
between retail and institutional/professional investors is a pivotal concept in this study. In fact
we argue that information delivered by different means of communication to different kinds and
segments of audience is able to produce different effects as measured by stock market valuations.
Loughran McDonald (2013) (Loughran and McDonald 2013) show the importance and the effects
of information disclosure for professional. They find that the level of negative tone used in the
S-1 forms is associated with greater underpricing and price revision. We differ from Loughran
McDonald (2013) as we consider the effect of newspaper reporting over the same IPO dimensions.
This is not minor difference as we believe that the sentiment from the filing and the media is not
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only independent (as diverse is the information source) but, most important, direct to different
audience.
This difference in information effect is also related to the difference in the timing in which
different investors may enter in the market, especially considering the complex and long dynamics
of an IPO process. Better-informed (institutional) investors are more likely to invest during the
pre-market period, also taking part in the book-building phase. We argue that informed investors,
who have access to higher detail of information and possess and greater ability to process raw
information, are less affected by the way financial newspaper present and convey the information
on IPO shares. To the contrary, retail (uninformed) investors, who take part to the IPO process
in a later stage, are more influenceable by the tone used from primary media source. Along
this line we test whether a causality between media coverage/sentiment and IPO characteristics
exists, taking in particular account the first-day returns dynamics. Our aim is to show that both a
larger and a contently more positive coverage is able to significantly influence the IPO process,
generating an increase in the not-qualified demand, leading so to a greater demand for the stock
on the market and consequentially to a more severe underpricing.
Differently than the most recent improvements in the literature (like Liu et al. 2014 (Liu,
Sherman, and Zhang 2014b)), we are able to determine the quality (and not only the volume)
of the coverage each IPO receives. Media are indeed able to impact over their audience not
only as a result of the mere coverage (attention effect) but also through the judgement embedded
into the articles. Indeed, we show that the content (tone) effect is different and additional to
the respect of the coverage effect. We measure the tone of the news detecting the degree of
positiveness, negativeness and uncertainty positive, negative and uncertain sentiment. While we do
not find any effects on the negative sentiment, we do find an effect of positive sentiment on both
underpricing and price revision. The uncertainty is measured through different metrics, each
of them capturing different angles: (a) a direct proxy of uncertain tone (Uncertainty sentiment),
(b) a proxy for litigious/legal tone (Litigious sentiment) in order to understand to what extent
each firm is associated which legal concerns and (c) modal weak and (d) modal strong tone, that
measure the level of self-confidence and certainty in the way in which each text has been written,
increasing for higher level of modal strong sentiment and lower level of modal weak sentiment. All
these measures find their foundation and validity in Loughran and McDonald 2011. Even though
the importance of uncertainty has been emphasized in the theoretical and empirical financial
research, there is unanimity on which could be the direction of the effect of uncertainty on the
IPO process. Though, we propose two competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between
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media-driven uncertainty and IPO pricing.
This paper is organized as follow: in Section II a literature review will be proposed, merging
together key contributions coming from both the two streams of related literature: IPO and the
Media and finance. In Section III we provide detail on data and methodology, and we put forward
our main hypotheses. Section IV presents the empirical results whilst in Section V we provide
some robustness checks. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. Related researches and hypotheses development
This paper grounds its theoretical foundations on two different streams of literature. On the one
hand, under the idea that media act as a mean to reduce the information gap between issuing
firm and retail investors, we aim at marginal contributing to the role of information asymmetry in
shaping the pricing of IPOs. On the other hand, we want to contribute to the growing literature
on the relationship between media and finance, shedding some light on the effect of newspaper
coverage and tone over a uninvestigated financial dimension such as the initial public offering. We
believe that this empirical setting we analyze in this paper provides a clean test to understand to
what extent the media industry really influences the financial markets. In fact, before the listing
the issuing firm is generally little known among the retail investors. To the contrary, in the process
of going public any firm experiences a potential dramatic change in visibility, the degree at which
that occurs is greatly determined by the amount and the quality of media coverage. As not all the
IPO firms receive equal attention from the media, we are able to disentangle the effect of coverage
from the other traditional investigated firm and deal’s characteristics in determining the observed
level of underpricing.
The role of media has become increasingly relevant. The cost of collecting, filtering and analyzing
financial information acts as a barrier for uninformed investors, who can hence only rely on
information that is publicly available and easy to access. Newspapers respond to both these
characteristics as they (a) select - due to a scarcity of printed space - a limited amount of information
and (b) present the information in a way that becomes accessible (comprehensible) to its readers.
Over the last decade the political science and the financial literature has investigated the effects
of media reporting, under the idea that media can both enhance the level of information among
market participants but likewise produce cognitive bias. Beasly and Pratt (2006) (Besley and
Prat 2006) propose a model for the relation between media and political power, underlying how
dangerous could be the noncoercive caption of the media by the governments. Evidence about
the problem of misreporting are documented also by Djankov et al (Djankov et al. 2003), and
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by Mullainathan and Shleifer (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), who suggest the risk of having
media with concentrated ownership, government-friendly attitude, and audience bearing biased
news. The presence of systematically slanted news has been proven to be effective and potential
dangerous in term of outcomes, as not-correctly informed individuals tend to take second best
decisions. Della Vigna and Kaplan (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007) show as republican friendly
news reporting by the Fox News channel has critically changed the electoral outcomes in several
electoral districts. Gentzkow et al. (Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin 2006) highlight how the
bias phenomenon could be limited in presence of specific market characteristics, like competition
between media, audience capability to understand and eventually judge misreporting, and media
specific reputational effect. Media may influence the audience also when they do not produce
high-level products in terms of quality of information. This trait makes media potentially harmful
but also potentially important as defense against illicit and damaging behaviours, being able to
permanently jeopardize an organization’s reputation. Dyck et al. (Dyck, Moss, and Zingales 2013)
presents a model in which media successfully prevent legislators to act against public interest.
Several papers (Miller 2006, Dyck et al. 2008, Dyck et al. 2010 (Miller 2006; Dyck, Volchkova, and
Zingales 2008; Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010)) show how media may be able to act as watchdog
against frauds, expropriations and other harmful behaviours. (Miller 2006; Dyck, Volchkova, and
Zingales 2008; Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010).
Other scholar focus instead on the effectiveness on media on the asset pricing, from a wide
set of viewpoints. Tetlock (Tetlock 2007) studies the relation between media outcomes, investors’
sentiment and financial market, while Fang and Peress (Fang and Peress 2009) focus instead on
media role in resolving informational frictions. Tetlock (Tetlock 2011) describes the difference
between actual news effect and the effect of already available information on which media focus
the public attention. Consistently with this paper, Liu et al. (Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014b) show
as the attention effect after a company goes public is a mean reverted process when considering the
long run. Dougal et al. (Dougal et al. 2012) instead find out how the tone of a Wall Street Journal
popular column published all the days is related to stock market overall performance while Garcia
(Garcia 2013) considers instead articles published on The New York Times. Media though are able
to affect stock markets in many different ways. They are able to convey important information
about irregular affairs (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010; Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales 2008), they
may generate a common sense of trust or of absence of trust on market makers (Stulz 1999; Moy
and Pfau 2000), they may also convey information that is totally already available generating in
this way abnormal performances just for have mentioned something (Huberman and Regev 2001;
Chan 2003; Barber and Odean 2008). Most importantly though media convey to financial markets
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huge amount of real information, exercising their prominent role of collecting, elaborating, and
dealing pieces of news. This holds also for initial public offerings as many other corporate events.
The other stream of literature this paper refers to is the IPO pricing. Explaining IPOs patterns
and specifically the dynamics of IPOs underpricing has been long debated in the financial
literature and several have been the offered rationales. However, the pivotal role of information
and informative asymmetries represents a common thread in most of the used arguments. Starting
from the evidence that there are investors better informed than others, Rock (Rock 1986) develops a
model based on the lemon-model by Akerlof (Akerlof 1970). Rock argues that uniformed investors,
being less able to assess the IPO quality, tend to overweight their portfolios with not-valuable IPOs,
suffering in this way a sort of winner curse. In equilibrium uninformed investors earn zero initial
returns while informed investors earn returns that can just cover the cost sustained to acquire
information. Consistently with this view, Aggarwal, Prabhala,and Puri (Aggarwal, Prabhala, and
Puri 2002) show that institutional investors earn greater returns than retail investors. Other scholars
(Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Hanley 1993) underline how the disclosure of positive information
before the settlement of the IPO offer price, positively influences the offer price1, directly leading
to a lower IPO underpricing. A recent paper by Loughran McDonald (Loughran and McDonald
2013) seems confirming this view, as they show that a more negative content in the IPO S-1 filings
is associated with a more severe underpricing phenomenon. If information disclosure is able to
produce more precise offer price and consequentially smaller IPO underpricing, why issuers do
not reveal to the market a more accurate informative set, reducing in this way the information
asymmetry? Sherman Titman (Sherman and Titman 2002) suggest the presence of a trade-off
between issuer-specific benefits of a more accurate offer price and the cost of disclose information.
Ljungqvist, Jenkinson,and Wilhelm (Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm Jr 2003) and Loughran
Ritter (Loughran and Ritter 2002; Loughran and Ritter 2004) both emphasize the role played by
underwriters and investment-banks during the IPO process: the former highlighting the role
of investment-banks in disclosing information aimed at mitigating underpricing, the latter in
suggesting the existence of an agency problem between issuers and underwriters generated by the
underwriters’ payment mechanism2. Consistent with this view we argue that media coverage can
play an important role in enhancing the information set available to investors. More specifically,
we believe that IPOs receiving larger coverage (i.e., greater number of articles or wider spaces in
the printed newspapers) become more visible to the investors and this effect in turns translate
1Positive information disclosure, if reliable, shifts the informational asymmetry in favour of IPO issuer, making possible
for the issuer itself to increase the offer price.
2The underwriter fees are usually directly proportional to the total proceeds that are usually bigger in a expected-
underpriced IPO.
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into a higher demand for shares. Based on the demand upward shift, (a) underwriters are likely
to upward revise the offer price and (b) the unmet demand during the offer period is likely to
produce a splillover effect on the first day of trading, causing a larger positive returns. Accordingly,
we postulate the following hypotheses:
A larger media coverage is positively associated with both price revision (H1) and underpricing (H2) .
The magnitude of underpricing or price revision is not only related to the amount of available
information around the IPO process but also to the precision (quality) of the information disclosed.
Initial public offerings associated with a greater level of uncertainty - especially about the IPO
value itself - result in higher expected underpricing (Ritter 1984; Beatty and Ritter 1986). Consistent
with this argument several scholars (Ross 1977; Ritter 1984; Hughes 1986; Allen and Faulhaber
1989) point out the importance for IPO issuers to signal their quality to the prospective investors
as a means to reduce the expected underpricing. Along this line, hiring reputable underwriters
(Booth and Smith II 1986) or having being VC-backed (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Lee and
Wahal 2004) have been shown to be indirect way to signal the IPO quality. Hence, if the amount
of information spread out by the media may serve as a means to make the issuing firm more
visible for the uninformed investors, the way the same information is reported may likewise
produce important and potentially diverse effects. Given a particular information reported in
a newspaper, the tone used in the article may completely change the perception of the reader
(investor) regarding the IPO quality/pricing and accordingly modify the investment behavior.
Following this intuition we postulate a relationship between the sentiment used in the article
and the two studied dimensions: underpricing and price revision. Specifically we argue that a
more positive (negative) sentiment, everything else constant, make retail investors more (less)
incline to demand shares either during the offering period or in the aftermarket. If most of the
media information flows into the market during the offering period, we hypothesize a positive
(negative) relationship between positive (negative) tone and price revision; if the media covers
the IPO right before the first trade date, we postulate the same effect materializing over the level
of underpricing. These effects are not necessarily mutually exclusive. If newspapers consistently
send positive (negative) signals to the market during the entire IPO offering period the media
effect (investor perception) may be continuously reinforced leading to upward (downward) price
revision as well as positive (negative) first-day returns. Hence, we posit the following hypotheses:
A positive (negative) media sentiment is positively (negatively) associated with the level of price revision
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(H3) and underpricing (H4)
The other investigated sentiment is the degree of uncertainty. The possible of effect of the
uncertain tone is less clear-cut. On the one hand we may rely on the demand-for-share story. If
media are successful in increasing the perceived level of uncertainty among retail investors, they
should decrease their demand for shares. Consequently we could expect, in response to a higher
uncertain media sentiment, lower underpricing. Consequently, we may suggest the following
competing hypotheses:
A larger degree of media uncertainty is negatively associated with the level of underpricing (H5a)
On the other hand, the uncertainty per se does not necessarily reduce the appetite for shares
if the expected return is higher. Underwriters may react to the higher perceived uncertainty
by setting the offer price even further below its fundamental value, increasing the expected
underpricing and compensating prospective investors with larger first-day returns. Accordingly,
we should observe a positive relationship between media uncertainty and the level of underpricing,
leading to the following hypothesis:
A larger degree of media uncertainty is positively associated with the level of underpricing (H5b)
The level of media uncertainty is also likely to affect price revision towards two possibly
opposite directions. In response to the higher degree of perceived uncertainty, underwriters may
voluntarily underprice the offer. This action is unlikely to take place during the filing period,
when the filing range is determined, as most of the media coverage has not produced its effects.
Therefore, we could expect that underwriters may react to the uncertain media sentiment by
downward revising the offer price. If this might be the case, we could push forward the following
hypothesis:
A larger degree of media uncertainty is negatively associated with the price revision (H6a)
However, a positive association between media uncertain sentiment and price revision is also
possible. The increased level of uncertainty makes it the stock valuation a more arduous task for
the price-setters. Underwriters may therefore revise the offer price, relative to the mid of the filing
range, when they access to higher information set gathered through the bookbuilding process.
Accordingly, we should posit a positive relationship between media uncertainty and price revision:
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A larger degree of media uncertainty is positively associated with the price revision (H6b)
To sum up, we expect to find a positive relation between media coverage and both price
revision and first-day returns (visibility effect), as well as a concordant effect of the media sentiment
(positive/negative) over the same IPO phenomena. We consider retail investors to be influenced
by media outcomes in a sense of being more likely to buy stocks they have heard about (coverage
effect) and they have heard about in a positive way (sentiment effect). Instead, we posit a number of
competing hypotheses regarding the level of uncertainty produced by the media coverage that
might potentially lead to an increasing or decreasing effect over the price revision and the level of
underpricing.
We also argue that media coverage produces an independent and different effect than what
mandatory disclosure generates3. Media do not report news basing exclusively on the contents
that firms voluntarily disclose during the IPO process.
III. Data and Methodology
I. Data sample
We collect a sample of 3,061 IPOs in the U.S. stock markets between January 1995 and December
2013 from the SDC/Platinum Global New Issues database. We exclude from sample real estate
investment trusts (REIT), closed-end funds, unit IPOs and unit investment trusts, rights issues,
spin-offs, equity carve-outs, financial firms (with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), foreign firms,
leveraged buy-out firms (LBO), shelf-registrations, withdrawn IPOs, IPOs with an offer price
lower than five dollar, and duplicate observations. Accounting data from Compustat and stock
price data from CRSP. We obtain firm age data from Jay Ritter’s website as well as the analyst
coverage data. News are collected from the Lexis-Nexis database. We search for articles related
to each IPO on the New York Times, using the firm name as key word and allowing for common
variations.4 We furthermore exclude from the dataset all the articles with no real informational
content, i.e. articles that are just a list of incoming or just happened IPOs, and we keep track about
their presence5. News search range estands between one year before the filing date to the fist-day
3The informational content disclosed by the issuing firm through the S-1 files that have to be delivered to the SEC to
enter the IPO process.
4We firstly search for the complete company name and then we allow for common variations and abbreviations like Inc,
Co, Corp, Intl, Lmt, Limited, Group
5The New York Times also publishes on a weekly base a complete list of incoming or present IPOs, without providing
further information other than the name of the issuing firms and the size of the IPOs (total proceeds and number of shares
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of trading. This search generates a dataset of 20,648 articles covering 1,561 IPOs out of 3.061.
We measure the influence of media on the pricing of IPOs taking into consideration the news
reported in the New York Times (as in Garcia 2013). The New York Times is first in circulation
among daily U.S. newspaper, if we exclude specialized press such as Wall Street Journal and
tabloids.6
Finally, S-1 forms are obtained form EDGAR. Using as search criterion the CIK (Central Index
Key) we are able to match 2,082 S-1 forms out of our 3,061 IPOs that comprise our sample. As
for the sample of news, we process these documents in order to infer the embedded sentiment,
excluding not meaningful particles, such as ASCII- encoded segments (i.e. pdf’s, jpg’s), HTML,
and XBRL (Loughran and McDonald 2013).
II. Textual analysis
Textual analysis for both articles and S-1 forms is carried out as in Loughran and McDonald
2011. This methodology, widely used and tested in the literature (Tetlock 2011; Dougal et al. 2012;
Garcia 2013), is based on searching from a financial document a list of words that are likely to be
associated with some sentiment attributes (positiveness, negativeness, uncertainty and litigiousness).
The frequency of these particular words within each document allows infering the tone used by
the writer. We first employ a "bags of words" approach7, but keeping trace of the order in which
words appear, in order to account for negations.8. We then parse documents into particles and we
exclude not meaningful terms (like encoding parts that are not actual words). Analyzing the New
York Times articles we also apply a regular expressions based script to correctly identify and separate
for each piece of news some important data like title, author(s), date of publication, and body of
the text.
From the sample of 20,648 news we then aggregate the information in order to obtain IPO-level
measures of media coverage and sentiment. We estimate the IPO coverage by summing the total
number of articles (N. Articles) and the total number of words used in the articles related to each
offered).
6Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation
7We consider each article as formed as a collection of terms that, at least in a first stage, are not ordered or related each
other. Textual analysis is performed just considering the frequencies with which each word appears in the text. We then
consider also the order when we allow for negations, since we are interest in understanding to which word is effectively
referred the negations. In this way, given a list of negation words, we are able to count how many times a positive or
negative word is negated, and we drop these cases from the total occurrences of positive and negative words.
8Similarly to what Loughran and McDonald did, we consider an extra list of negation words, like not or nobody and we
count the frequency they appear before positive and negative word. We finally consider the positive and negative counts
excluding the cases in which positive and negative words are negated in a range of 3 words.
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IPO (N. Words). We also created a news dummy equal to one when the IPO is covered by the NYT.
We compute the tone metrics as the average of the frequency of each sentiment attributes across
the news reporting information of a specific IPO. For instance, if for IPO A we find three articles
having 4, 5 and 6 percent of positive words (relative to the overall number of words) respectively,
the positive sentiment (positive sentiment) will be equal to 5 percent. Consistently, we aggregate at
the IPO-level the other three sentiment attributes, i.e. negativeness (negative sentiment), uncertainty
(uncertainty sentiment), litigiousness (litigious sentiment) and level of confidence and certainty in the
way in which news are written (modal weak and modal strong).
III. Data Summary Statistics
Our sample comprises 3,061 IPOs and 20,648 articles published on the New York Times. Table 1
shows that each IPO is covered on average by 6,21 articles in the whole period considered (from
one year before the filing to the first trade date). However, the distribution is highly skewed as a
large fraction of IPOs receive no coverage9 and in median new issues are covered only once. To
the contrary, some IPO receive large attention from the NYT and this is evident looking at the
high standard deviation of the number of articles and at its maximum value. This finding is also
aligned with our expectation of selective coverage. As expected a large part of information is
reported after the filing date. The average number of news is in fact 4.44 between the filing to
the IPO date, compared to 1.59 in the year before the filing. The difference appears even larger
that these numbers can evidence if we take into account the different time-span they refer to. In
fact, if the pre-filing period embraces 365 days, the post-filing period varies for each issue and
it is equal to 107 (81) days in average (median). Dissecting the information before and after the
filing date is also important for our investigation. Loughran and McDonald (2013) investigate the
effect of the S-1 tone over the IPO pricing (namely, underpricing and price revision). Since S-1s
become public at the filing date, we are to verify, comparing the sentiment pre- and post-filing,
whether media are somehow influenced by the tone of mandatory information required by the SEC.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
91,500 IPOs we detect no articles reporting information about the new issue.
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Table 1 (Panel B) also reports the summary statistics at the article level. N_Words represents the
number of words contained in an article. Unlike Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014a, we proxy media
coverage taking into account not only the number of articles but also the room the newspaper
has reserved to the IPO (number of words) We argue that N_Words is a more robust coverage
indicator than what has been proposed in Liu et al. paper (Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014a). The
other variables reported in Table 1 (Panel B) proxy the quality of the coverage, i.e. the sentiment.
They represent the percentage of positive, negative, uncertainty related, legal related (litigious),
weakening (modal weak), and strengthening (modal strong) words on the total words of each
articles. Both for positive and negative sentiment, the percentages reported here are at the net of the
exclusions for negated sentiments (we exclude from the counts the occasions in which a positive or
a negative word is actually negated and its real meaning is different than expected.). Each article is
on average (in median) composed by 685 (570) words, among which 0.006 % (0.005 %) are positive,
0.010 % (0.008 %) are negative, 0.006 % (0.005 %) are uncertainty related, 0.002 % (0.000 %) are
litigious related, 0.003 % (0.003 %) are modal weak, and 0.004 % (0.003 %) are modal strong.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 displays (bold line) the time-path of news reporting the (IPO-average) cumulative
frequency of articles. In order to compare IPOs having different lengths of the IPO process, we
standardize by the number of days occurred between filing to the first trade date. Accordingly, the
time interval between -1 to 0 correspond the the year before the filing date (with no cross-variation
among IPOs); the time-interval between 0 to 1 represents instead the (relative) period between
filing to the first trade date. Consistent with what earlier reported, the coverage largely increases
after the filing date10 but, interestingly, the slope of the cumulative distribution of articles does
not change during the post-filing period. This shape suggests that the media coverage does not
exhibit peaks around the filing or immediately prior the first trade date but it shows a quite steady
trend throughout the entire post-filing period.
Coverage provided before and after the filing date does not change only in terms of quantity of
coverage (from now on coverage), but also in terms of quality of coverage (from now on sentiment).
As shown in Table 2 articles published before and after the filing date are significantly different.
104,867 out of 20,648 articles are published before the filing date.
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Comparing the two panels of the table (the Pre Filing Period and the Post Filing Period) we note how
both the coverage (number of words) and the sentiment indicators are more pronounced in the first
subset. This evidence suggests that, despite the fewer number of article before the filing date, on
average each article contains a greater number of word and a more pronounced sentiment traits.
We believe the motivation is twofold. First, before the filing, only a certain type of prospective
IPO firm is likely to be media covered, that is a company with a potential for attracting the
interest of the newspaper readers. Generally speaking, these firms appear to be larger and more
glamour. After the filing date, even smaller and less known firms begin to be media followed, but
presumably the limited reader’s interest produces both a decrease of the average length of each
article and a more neutral writer’s tone. Second, as soon as the IPO process begins, it is likely
that newspapers report potential price-sensitive information more prudentially, smoothing and
diluting the influence of the journalists’ beliefs.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics at the IPO level. The first panel reports the statistics for
the dependents (Underpricing and Price Revision) and control variables, whilst panel B for coverage
and sentiment, both at the article and at the S-1 level. In order to have the second set of metrics
at the IPO level, coverage measures account for the cumulative distribution of news per IPO,
while sentiment metrics reflect the average across the articles associated to each offer. First-day
returns is the percentage different between first day of trade closing price and the offer price; Price
revision is the ratio between the final offer price and the mid of the bookbuiling price range (minus
one). The former denotes an average (median) underpricing of 27 (11) percent, while the latter
shows that offer price has been in average (and in median) set 1 percent above the mid-price.
The third variable (Proceeds) proxies for the IPO size and shows that the average firm collects
nearly 100 million dollar through the offer. VC dummy shows that approximately 46 percent of
the IPO in our sample have received a financing from venture capitalists. The Reputation measure
is computed as in Carter and Manaster (Carter and Manaster 1990) and accounts for the market
share of the leading underwriter among all IPOs in the four year before the IPO date or in the
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largest period available. The remaining variables indicate that the average firm’s age (Age at trade)
when it becomes public is 15 years (8 years in median), and rougly 8 percent of our IPO firms
is analyst-followed (Analyst Dummy). Panel B lists the variables obtained from textual analysis,
regarding both newspapers articles and S-1 forms. The first section the Table reports the coverage
variables, i.e. variables that explain if the IPO is followed by the New York Times (News Dummy),
how many articles an IPO has received (Number of Articles), and how many words have been
used by the newspaper to describe an IPO (Number of Words). In the second section of Panel B
the sentiment variables are reported. The fewer number of observations results from the partial
NYT coverage of our sample of IPOs. The last section reports the sentiment embedded in the
firm-generated S-1 documents. These variables represent the degree of positiveness (as well as the
degree of negativeness and uncertainty) of firms when disclosing SEC mandatory information
and they are important to detect the separate effect of media coverage and firm specific disclosure
(Loughran and McDonald 2013).
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
From Table 3 we know that approximately half of our sample has received the attention of NYT.
This evidence is important for two reasons. First, we still little know about what type of firm more
than others is more likely to be media-covered. Intuitively, we might think that larger and more
glamour firms should lead to a greater newspaper coverage but no prior investigation has clearly
showed which firms’ characteristics explain the media coverage. In this paper we aim at shedding
some light on this regard. The IPO setting is particularly suitable to address this research question
as firms, becoming publicly traded, experience a visibility shock. Second, as the sub-sample of
covered IPOs is potentially highly diverse from the media-neglected firms, any inference drawn
on the sample of IPOs with associated news might be suffering from a selection problem and
hence being biased. This suspect is strongly confirmed by looking at Table 4, reporting descriptive
statistics for the two sub-samples of covered and media-neglected IPOs. Covered IPOs have on
average greater first-day returns (more than double) and larger price revisions. Although most
of this gap may be driven by idiosyncratic IPO characteristics, the difference in the IPO pricing
is likely to be also affected by media influence. Clearly these findings need to be corroborated
with a multivariate analysis, as the two sub-samples differ in a number of other characteristics
that might potentially drive the investigated phenomena: media-followed IPOs are indeed able to
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collect larger proceeds, are more likely VC-backed, taken public by more reputable underwriter
and followed by analysts in the aftermarket..
IV. Results
In order to understand the role of the media (coverage and sentiment) on some highly investigated
IPO phenomena we undertake a three-step approach. First, we wish comprehending whether
media firms tend to follow more in depth specific type of firms as well as showing whether the
media sentiment is associated with some firm’s characteristics. As said, the answer to this question
is at the same time a novel contribution and the base to assess the existence of selection bias in
inferring from a sample of covered IPOs. Second, under the hypothesis that media can enhance
the information flow to uninformed investors, we investigate the marginal explanatory power of
media coverage and sentiment over the level of observed underpricing and price revision. Third,
we provide some robustness to our findings controlling for the informative effect of S-1 forms, for
potential correlation between the media measures and the other independent variables and for the
potential sample selection bias.
I. The Determinants of Media Coverage
Intuitively it is reasonable to assume that larger and more known firms receive greater attention
from media when they decide to go public. However, to the best of our knowledge, we still lack
of a clear evidence if this intuition is anyhow grounded and which other firms’ characteristics
are associated with media coverage. Furthermore, if it is somehow possible postulating casual
relations between firms’ characteristics and number of articles (Table 5), to foresee the same
relationships to the news sentiment is certainly harder (Table 6).
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Table 5 clearly shows that news coverage is significantly affected by several ex ante IPO-firms
traits, regardless the proxy used to account for the coverage itself. In model (1) we investigate
coverage determinants using a logit regression where we use, as dependent variable, a dummy
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variable taking the value of one when an IPO is covered (i.e., we collect at least one article
reporting information on the offer). Consistent with our expectations, results show that the firm
size (Log-Proceeds) positively affect the probability of being covered by the The New York Times,
as well as being taken public by an highly reputed underwriter and being VC-backed. Quite
surprisingly firm age does not seem influencing the propensity of The New York Times to cover the
IPO firm. Model (2) and model (3) are ordinary least-squares linear models, where the number of
articles and the overall number of words are used as dependent variables. In both case results
confirm previous findings from model (1). Larger IPO firms result being more actively covered
(both in terms of articles and in terms of total number of words) as well as IPO underwritten by
reputable investment banks or VC-backed receive more space on the New York Times . Model (3)
also evidences some statistical negative significance of firm’s age on coverage, suggesting that,
everything else constant, older issuers are less likely to attract the interest from the The New York
Times.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
The next step aims to investigating the determinants of media sentiment. Table 6 shows ordinary
least-squares linear regression models using as dependent variables the six sentiment indicators
of New York Times articles’ tone. First, we may observe how the sentiment is not affected by the
log of proceeds. This is to some extent a unexpected but important insight as it might have
been suspected that firm size may be associated with article’s tone. For instance, smaller firms,
due to their higher information asymmetry, could have been associated with a larger degree of
news uncertainty. Furthermore, bigger firms are potentially larger advertisement spender and
potentially associated with a more positive treatment from the media. Instead, none of these effects
is actually in place.11 Underwriter reputation, tech dummy and venture capitalist backed dummy seem
having some explanatory power over of the sentiment structure, even if none of them is able to to
influence the positive tone. Among the sentiment attributes, the one that seems to be more easily
predicted based on the firm’s characteristics is the level of uncertainty. Younger, high tech and
VC-backed firms, for which higher is the expected information asymmetry to the market, exhibit a
11The lack of sizeable correlation between proceeds and sentiment allows us to use IPO size as an instrument when we
control for possible selection bias.
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more pronounced level of news uncertainty. The tech dummy is also importantly associated with
the negative tone used by the New York Times . VC-backed dummy is negatively associated with
the news litigiousness, to suggest that firm that are followed by a professional venture capitalist
are generally less involved in litigations and other legal procedures, given the reputational and
professional support provided by the venute capital firm.
II. Media Coverage and First-Day Returns
One of the core contribution of this paper is to be able to correctly understand the linkage
between the informative set delivered by the media (proxied by the New York Times) and the
level of IPO underpricing and price revision. We argue that the New York Times is able to convey a
large set of information to the market and, specifically, to retail and not-professional investors
that are not otherwise able or willing to autonomously and independently reach important and
valuable information. The value of the information provided by the media comes from the costly
selection activity among the virtually endless amount of available information and from potentially
uncovering insider information. It is not uncommon that journalists, particularly from reputable
media providers, have special and reserved informative sources that would not disclose their
information if not in the anonymous way guaranteed by journalists themselves (what Dyck and
Zingales call the qui pro quo condition (Dyck and Zingales 2003)). Information contents of New
York Times articles is hence richer than the public available information, selected by high reputed
newspapers organizations and commented by specialist and highly-trained financial journalists.
Accordingly, if media can successfully enrich the information set of retail investors, it is plausible
to establish a casual relationship between the quantity (coverage) and the quality (sentiment) of
news and some IPO information-driven phenomena, such as the underpricing and price revision.
In terms of coverage, consistently with Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014a, we postulate a visibility
effect. More covered IPOs generate more interest on retail investors, more demand for IPO shares
and in turn higher likelihood of an upward revision of the offer price and larger first-day returns.
Unlike Liu, Sherman, and Zhang 2014a, who only provide a rough measure of coverage (based
on the sole count of the numeber of articles), we are able to test this hypothesis employing a
larger and finer spectrum of metrics. We are able in fact not only to measure the numeber of
published article, but also the size of the articles (as measured as total number of words) and time
distribution of the articles across the different phases of the IPO process. However, we believe
that the most important and novel contribution arises from the analysis of the news sentiment over
these IPO phenomena. Retail investors are surely influenced by the media hype but the tone of
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the news potentially produces a even larger effect in shaping the reader’s beliefs. Accordingly,
we postulate that first-day returns and the price revision should be larger when associated with
disclosed positive information (positive sentiment) and decreasing following negative information
(negative sentiment), while the effects following information about litigiousness (litigious sentiment),
uncertainty-related information indicators (uncertainty and model weak sentiment and the backwards
of modal strong sentiment) may potentially lead to both these directions.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Table 7 shows ordinary least-squares linear regression models using first-day returns (i.e. the
underpricing) as dependent variable. As a first and undoubted insight, we notice a coverage effect,
present, significant, and persistent in all the model proposed. The positive coefficient is consistent
with our hypothesis (H2) and economically sizeable as one standard deviation on the number of
words increases the underpricing by approximately 9 percentage points. Switching our attention
to the sentiment indicators, model (1) evidences a strong and significant positive relation between
positive sentiment and the underpricing. Also the economic magnitude of these effects is important
as one standard deviation in the positive sentiment increases the underpricing by 0.0473, while the
same change in the uncertainty increases the underpricing by 0.033885.This result confirms the
conjecture that a benevolent treatment from media increases the investors’ interest towards the
offer and in turn the demand for shares and the firs-day price. Consistent with our hypotheses,
also the degree of uncertainty embedded in the news seems to play a role in determining the
level of underpricing as both uncertainty sentiment and modal weak sentiment show a positive a
statistical (at 10 percent level) significance. The positive relationship seems supporting hypothesis
H5b over the competing hypothesis H5a, suggesting that, when media report information with a
more uncertain tone, underwriters more severely underprice the offer in response to the larger
returns required by the investors to be compensated for the higher uncertainty.12
These results hold after controlling for year and industry effects, as well as a number of variables
commonly used to explain the underpricing: log of proceeds, offer price revision, tech dummy,
venture capital backed dummy, reputation of the leading underwriter, presence of analyst following
12It could be argued that these findings may suffer from endogeneity problems or reverse causality. For instance, the
underpricing could produce a more favorable media treatment and not the opposite. However, the time-structure of
the data offers shelter from this potential concern. The news we collect refer to a period before the trade date when the
underpricing becomes known.
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the IPO, log of age of the IPO firm, average returns in the month of IPO, and percentage of IPOs
above the midpoint in the considered month. The sign and the statistical significance of the control
variables appear in line with previous studies.
Table 8 reports instead a number of regression models where we use price revision as dependent
variable and as explanatory variables the same set of media coverage, sentiment and controls we
have previously employed.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Starting with the coverage effect, we report a virtually absent role of the number of words over the
level of price revision.13 The measure of media coverage shows a slightly statistical significance (at
10 percent level) in just two out of six models, precisely in those in which sentiment indicators turn
to be insignificant.This result is explainable in the light of our proposed framework: we argue that
media is mainly able to influence uninformed/retail agents, more than professional/institutional
investors who build their beliefs using different information sources. In particular, institutional
investors benefit from a direct contact with the issuing firm, even if mediated by the filter of the
underwriters. Moreover, given their superior skills, professional investors only marginally rely on
the information processed by the media provider but they rather base their judgments over their
interpretation of the raw available information. Having this consideration in mind, it is to little
extent surprising that phenomena greatly driven by retail demand , such as the first-day returns,
are more affected by media-effects than other dimensions, like price revision, more influenced by
the action of institutional investors.
Switching to the analysis of the tone attributes, Table 8 presents similar findings to what showed
for the determination of the underpricing. Price revision appears to be positively related to (a) the
positive sentiment and (b) the level of uncertainty, supporting hypotheses H3 and H6b, respectively.
The level of statistical significance is for the positive sentiment and for the two proxies of uncertainty,
uncertainty and modal weak, at the 5 percent level. Also the economic magnitude of these effects is
somehow similar as one standard deviation in the positive sentiment increases the price revision
by 0.0067, while the same change in the uncertainty produces a 0.0064 upward revision.14 The
positive sentiment seems producing an effect throughout the entire IPO process, being able to affect
both price revision and first-day returns, likely due to a demand-driven outcome. Similarly, the
13The other proxy of media coverage, the news dummy and the number of articles, produce similar effects.
14The same effect for modal weak is 0.0068.
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media uncertain sentiment causes higher observed underpricing (we argue due to an increase of
investors’ required returns) and larger price revision (probably produced by the higher difficulties
in fairly setting the offer price). As for previous regressions, these results hold after controlling
for IPO size, firm’s riskiness, underwriter reputation, IPO market conditions, industry and year
effects.
V. Robustness Checks
Previous findings have shown that media coverage and sentiment are able to produce effects over
the observed level of underpricing as well as the price revision. In this section we aim at providing
a number of robustness checks in order to show that the presented insights are not driven by
unconsidered issues. The first control we offer concerns the informative role of S-1 forms, in
order to verify that the New York Times is delivering a brand new informative set, and it is not just
translating and publicly reporting technical information already disclosed by the IPO firm itself.
The second concern we have relates to the correlation between the sentiment indicators and the
firm and IPO’s characteristics. As shown in this paper, media sentiment is vaguely associated with
some specific type of firms. In order to control for it, we repeat the analysis using as sentiment
indicators the residuals from the models where we regress the sentiment measures over the
pre-market IPO firm characteristics. Finally, applying an Heckman selection model (Heckman
1979), we address the concern of possible selection bias due to the fact that just for half of the
sample is possible to extract information about related-news tone.
I. Controlling for S-1 informative contents
The first robustness check aims at dispelling the suspect that articles from the New York Times
do not provide incremental valuable information to the market, as what reported in the media
may be simply greatly anticipated by the legal documents that issuing firms are required to fill
in (S-1 forms). We present robust and diffuse evidence on our data this concern is unjustified.
The first evidence comes from analysing the sign of media sentiment coefficients relative to the
corresponding results computed using the S-1 files. Loughran and McDonald (2003) find that
negative S-1 sentiment increases the underpricing, while we find the same phenomeon is caused
by a positive media sentiment. This difference suggests that media and S-1 sentiments are not
correlated measures as we might think. In other words, it seems dispelled the doubt that the way
the underwriter communicates to the SEC trhough the filings is able to influence the tone that
journalists use when they report IPO information.
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INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
Furthermore, for sake of completeness, we collect the same data as in Loughran and McDonald
(2013) to verify that media sentiment produces an effect over and above what S-1 sentiment can
offer. Table 9 confirms our predictions as New York Times articles positive sentiment maintains
its positive and significant effect also after controlling for S-1 sentiment. The fact that a positive
sentiment (on the daily newspaper) has a same sign effect than a negative one (on the S-1 form)
may be explained within the framework of market segmentation. Investors who have access to the
S-1 forms differ from those who read IPO information on the New York Times and, most important,
different is the timing at which the two set of information are disclosed. Unlike the positive
sentiment, the proxies of uncertainty lose their statistical significance at least at the conventional
levels. Uncertainty and modal weak keep their positive coefficients but they are not longer significant,
probably due to the lower number of observations.15
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE
Table 10 reports the same controls for price revision and we notice a similar patter to what
previously discussed. The effect of positive New York Times articles sentiment on price revision is
still present and robust. However, as for the underpricing, the media uncertainty loses statistical
power, even though coefficients are in line with what earlier presented.
II. Controlling using tone residuals
The first part of our analyses show that the media coverage and partially the media sentiment is
ex-ante explained by some firm and market characteristics. Even though, in explaining the level of
underpricing and price revision, we do control for such characteristics, a potential concern may
nevertheless arise due to the correlation among our explanatory variables. Therefore, we compute
15These regressions show a poorer sample size due to the drop out caused by the merge of our sample with the number
of companies for which we find information on S1.
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tone residuals after regressing each sentiment indicator against pre-IPO and market characteristics.
We then regress both first-day returns and price revision using these tone residuals as a proxy
of unpredictable content of the news, also controlling for news coverage. As we show in Table
11 and in Table 12 positive sentiment remains a good and significant predictor for both first-day
returns and price revision.
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE
As mentioned before the positive and significant coefficient associated with the residuals of
positive sentiment shows us how the positive sentiment embedded in the New York Times articles
effectively brings some extra informational content that cannot be explained by ex-ante IPO firm
characteristics and it is furthermore effective in shaping the dynamics of the IPO process. However,
unlike positive sentiment, the level of uncertainty appears to be less important in the explanation
of these phenomena. To some extent this result is not completely unexpected as, among the
sentiment indicators, uncertainty proxies were the most correlated with firms characteristics.
III. Controlling for endogeneity issue
We have previously suggested that our results might be potentially driven by a sample selection
bias. Since sentiment indicators can be only computed if media coverage is positive16, we want
to control if the reported association between sentiment and IPO phenomena is not caused by
a non-random sample selection. In order to do carry out such a check, we apply an Heckman
two-stage model (Heckman 1979) where in the first step we run a probit regression using the
News dummy as dependent variable, the same set of control variables but taking the LogProceed
as instrument. In the second step we use the predicted variables from the first stage regression to
estimate the corrected models for underpricing and price revision. Consistent with the other two
robustness checks, Table 13 shows how the relation between positive sentiment and underpricing
and price revision patterns firmly holds, whilst we do not longer evidence a statistically robust
association with the level of uncertainty.
16In other words, only if we find any article reporting information on that specific IPO.
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INSERT TABLE 13 HERE
INSERT TABLE 14 HERE
In Table 14 we observe the same phenomenon for price revision. Positive sentiment is the only one
still significant and useful in explaining the dependent variable, while uncertainty and negative
indicators are not producing any significant appreciable effects.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we show how influential and effective could be the media on the financial markets.
In order to test this relation we choose the IPO process empirical setting. In this framework the
information plays a pivotal role in shaping and conditioning the whole process. In the IPO process
a large amount of private information is gradually released to the public, together with a well
define set of ownership and administrative rights on the firms (i.e. stock shares). In this process
there are some individuals and groups that are able to reach and to process the information
before others. These last ones gradually start to disclose pieces of private information to the
public, transforming private information into public information. We argue in this last part of
the process the pivotal role to involve the large part of not-professional investors is played by
the media industry. In this study we aim at investigating the effect of media information over
the IPO process, analysing the coverage and the tone of the articles published in the New York
Times. We provide evidence that New York Times articles reporting information on an incoming
IPO are able to influence the IPO ina double fashion. First, the simple fact the the New York Times
dedicates spaces to a prospective publicly traded firm, generates by itself a visibility effect and
in turns an increase in the IPO first-day returns and price revision. Second, we show how articles
with more positive sentiment influence retail investors, the demand for IPO shares and a further
increase in the first-day returns patterns. After controlling for a number of compounding factors,
including S-1 informational contents, pre-market IPO firm characteristics, and possible selection
bias issues, we robustly show that media coverage and positive sentiment are important drivers in
determining the level of IPO underpricing and price revision.
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VII. Tables and Figures
Figure 1: IPOs coverage per period. In this graph the distribution of the coverage is reported. We standardized the
period before filing date and between filing date and first day of trade date. In the picture a cusp point is
evident in correspondence with the filing date which becomes a sort of watershed in the media attention
patterns.The effect of officially enter the IPO process by filing the required documentation at the filing date is
evident and it changes dramaticlly the slope of the line.
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Table 1: Summary statistics. The first panel (Panel A) reports the number of articles. In this panel the number of
article published in each period is reported. Whole sample refers to the total number of articles published
in the whole period, pre-filing refers to number of articles published from one year before the filing date to
the filing date itself, and post period refers to the period after the filing date until the first day of trade. In
the second panel (Panel B) some features of the articles are reported. In this panel the data about articles
analyzed are reported for the whole sample. All the articles are published on the printed version of the New
York Times and they involve specifically the firm going to become public. For each period N_Words is the
total number of words used in each article and the other variables are the sentiment indicators we are using.
They represent respectively: the percentage of positive words, the percentage of negative words, the percentage
of uncertainty-related word, and the percentage of legal words, the percentage of modal weak words, the
percentage of modal strong words. Both the percentages of positive and negative word are reported at the
net of negations (i.e. the cases in which positive/negative word are actually negated assuming so a different
meaning).
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Panel A Number of articles per period
whole sample 3061 6.21 39.06 0 1094 1
pre-filing 3061 1.59 14.11 0 453 0
post-filing 3061 4.44 25.41 0 650 0
Panel B Articles characteristics
N_Words 20648 685 662.2 0 16432 570.0
positive sentiment (%) 20648 0.006 0.005 0 0.087 0.005
negative sentiment (%) 20648 0.010 0.010 0 0.174 0.008
uncertain sentiment (%) 20648 0.006 0.005 0 0.085 0.005
litigious sentiment (%) 20648 0.002 0.005 0 0.130 0.000
modal weak sentiment (%) 20648 0.003 0.004 0 0.071 0.003
modal strong sentiment (%) 20648 0.004 0.005 0 0.125 0.003
80
Ph.D. Thesis - Carlo Raimondo - carlo.raimondo@unibo.it
Table 2: Summary Statistic and periods comparison. In this table coverage and sentiment variables are reported at
the article level, distinguishing for the period. The Pre Filing Period is the period between one-year before the
filing date and the filing date. The Post Filing period is instead the period after the filing date and before the
first day of trade. All the articles are published on the printed version of the New York Times and they involve
specifically the firm going to become public. For each period N_Words is the total number of words used in
each article and the other variables are the sentiment indicators we are using. They represent respectively: the
percentage of positive words, the percentage of negative words, the percentage of uncertainty-related word, the
percentage of legal words, the percentage of modal weak words, and the percentage of modal strong words.Both
the percentages of positive and negative word are reported at the net of negations (i.e. the cases in which
positive/negative word are actually negated assuming so a different meaning).
Sentiment patterns across pre and post filing periods
Obs Mean St Dev Min Max Median
Pre Filing Period
N_Words 4915 769.6 606.7 18 6025 689
positive sentiment (%) 4915 0.006 0.005 0 0.067 0.006
negative sentiment (%) 4915 0.010 0.010 0 0.111 0.008
uncertain sentiment (%) 4915 0.006 0.005 0 0.085 0.005
litigious sentiment (%) 4915 0.002 0.005 0 0.069 0.000
modal weak sentiment (%) 4915 0.004 0.004 0 0.056 0.003
modal strong sentiment (%) 4915 0.005 0.005 0 0.083 0.003
Post Filing Period
N_Words 13711 724.4 662.3 7 10479 601
positive sentiment (%) 13711 0.006 0.005 0 0.087 0.005
negative sentiment (%) 13711 0.010 0.010 0 0.174 0.008
uncertain sentiment (%) 13711 0.006 0.005 0 0.077 0.005
litigious sentiment (%) 13711 0.002 0.005 0 0.130 0.000
modal weak sentiment (%) 13711 0.003 0.004 0 0.063 0.003
modal strong sentiment (%) 13711 0.004 0.006 0 0.125 0.003
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Table 3: Summary statistics for IPO sample, 1995 - 2013.The sample includes 3061 U.S. IPOs with an offer price
at least $5 per share, excluding financial firms, REITs, and closed-end funds. The sample is obtained from
Thompson Financial Securities Data.In Panel A all variable all variables related to IPO are reported. In Panel
B we report instead all variable related to media coverage and mandatory disclosure by the firm (S-1 forms).
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P50
Panel A: IPO characteristics
First-day Returns 2,864 0.27 0.55 -0.88 6.97 0.11
Proceeds 3,023 99.70 123.27 3.45 933.80 59.48
Price Revision 3,061 0.01 0.13 -0.37 0.33 0.00
VC Dummy 3,061 0.46 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00
Reputation 3,061 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.03
Institutional Investors (number of) 3,061 27.99 26.10 0.00 421.00 23.00
Market Valuation 2,123 3.24 3.29 0.86 108.48 2.73
Market Valuation (Ind-Adjusted) 2,123 0.47 3.21 -2.56 105.98 0.00
Age at Trade 2,921 15.02 21.01 0.00 165.00 8.00
Analyst Dummy 2,522 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.00
Avg First Day Return 3059 26.70 26.10 -19.9 163.20 17.70
Rate IPOs Above Midpoint 3059 46.83 21.02 0.00 100.00 48.00
Panel B: Coverage and sentiment
News Dummy 3,061 0.51 0.50 0 1 1
Number of Articles 3,061 6.18 39.06 0 1,094 1
Number of Words 3,061 4,561.93 30,342.68 0 791,770 82
Positive Words (% points) 1,576 0.48 0.39 0 3.79 0.47
Negative Words (% points) 1,576 0.88 0.68 0 5.88 0.80
Uncertainty Words (% points) 1,576 0.46 0.36 0 2.70 0.44
Litigious Words (% points) 1,576 0.15 0.25 0 3.05 0.05
Modal Weak Words (% points) 1,576 0.26 0.24 0 2.06 0.24
Modal Strong Words (% points) 1,576 0.39 0.38 0 3.01 0.33
S-1 Positive Words (% points) 2307 0.3 0.2 0 1.3 0.3
S-1 Negative Words (% points) 2307 0.8 0.4 0 2.0 0.7
S-1 Modal Weak Words (% points) 2307 0.4 0.2 0 1.0 0.4
S-1 Modal Strong Words (% points) 2307 0.3 0.1 0 0.9 0.2
S-1 Litigious Words (% points) 2307 1.2 0.8 0 3.3 1.0
S1 Uncertainty Words (% points) 2307 0.6 0.3 0 1.5 0.6
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Table 4: Main variable summary statistics if covered by New York Times. We report all the most important variables
related to the IPO process putting in evidence the diffrences they experience if covered or not by the NYT.
Panel A reports summary statistics for IPO issues covered by NYT, Panel B reports the same for IPO issues
that are not covered. Covered IPOs are slightly bigger, they experience larger first-day returns as well as larger
price revisions. They are also associated with more reputed underwriters, with a larger proportion of venture
capitalists and analysts, and a larger number of institutional investors. Furthermore covered IPOs receive
better market valuation and they are, on average, related to older firms.
Panel A: IPO covered by The New York Times
Obs Mean Min Max Median St. Dev
First-Day Returns 1466 0.38 -0.87 6.98 0.16 0.68
Proceeds 1537 118.37 5.16 933.8 71.88 140.68
Price Revision 1575 0.03 -0.37 0.33 0.05 0.13
VC Dummy 1575 0.49 0 1 0 0.50
Tech Dummy 1575 0.49 0 1 0 0.50
Reputation 1575 0.07 0 0.34 0.06 0.06
Institutional Investors (n) 1575 33.34 0 421 28 30.43
Market Valuation (IndAdj) 1085 0.70 -2.42 105.98 0.04 4.13
Age 1516 15.86 0 158 7 22.55
Analyst Dummy 1365 0.29 0 1 0 0.45
Panel B: IPO not-covered by The New York Times
Obs Mean Min Max Median St. Dev
First-Day Returns 1397 0.17 -0.88 3.57 0-08 0.33
Proceeds 1485 80.39 3.45 870 47.5 98.63
Price Revision 1485 -0.01 -0.37 0.33 0 0.13
VC Dummy 1485 0.45 0 1 0 0.49
Tech Dummy 1485 0.52 0 1 1 0.50
Reputation 1485 0.05 0.00 0.34 0.02 0.06
Institutional Investors (n) 1485 22.33 0 117 18 18.96
Market Valuation (IndAdj) 1037 0.23 -2.56 21.70 -0.04 1.77
Age 1404 14.12 0 165 8 19.18
Analyst Dummy 1157 0.17 0 1 0 0.38
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Table 5: Regression table. Explaining the coverage received by Initial Public Offering in terms of ex ante characteristics
of the firm going public. In this set of regressions the dependent variables are all measuring the coverage
the IPOs receive, as measured as a NYT related coverage dummy (Column 1), as total number of articles
published on the NYT about each IPO (Column 2), and as total space the NYT devotes to each IPO, computed
as total number of words (column 3). The table shows how the NYT coverage of an IPO is positively associated
with the IPO dimension (LogProceeds), the underwriters reputation, and the presence a venture capitalist
involved in the process. The age of the issuing firm seems to be significant only to the extent of total space the
NYT devotes with a marginal negative effect on it. In all the regressions industry and year fixed effects are
considered.
(1) (2) (3)
Coverage Dummy N. articles N. Words
LogProceeds 0.929∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 2779.1∗∗∗
(13.10) (6.45) (5.25)
Reputation 3.301∗∗∗ 32.13∗∗∗ 28476.1∗∗∗
(3.79) (3.97) (3.98)
VC Dummy 0.242∗∗ 2.394∗∗∗ 2376.7∗∗∗
(2.47) (2.62) (2.94)
Tech Dummy -0.138 -1.802 -1397.0
(-1.04) (-1.46) (-1.28)
LogAge -0.0766 -0.606 -898.8∗∗
(-1.49) (-1.28) (-2.15)
Constant -3.250∗∗∗ -14.02 -9233.0
(-8.95) (-0.67) (-0.50)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2867 2879 2879
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Regression table: sentiment determinants. Explaining the sentiment received by Initial Public Offering in
terms of ex ante characteristics of the firm going public.In this set of regressions the dependent variables are all
measuring the quality of the coverage the IPOs receive, as measured as degree of positiveness, negativeness,
litigious, uncertainty and certainty in the way in which the articles are written (modal weak and modal
strong.). Each sentiment (corresponding to each column) has its own pattern when associated with the
explanatory variables. To be noticed how none of the sentiment is significantly associated with the dimension
of the IPO (here represented by the LogProceeds).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sentiment: positive negative litigious uncertainty modal weak modal strong
LogProceeds 0.00001 -0.00023 0.00014 -0.00012 -0.00006 -0.00013
(0.03) (-0.83) (1.28) (-0.83) (-0.64) (-0.82)
Reputation 0.0032 0.0080∗∗ 0.0006 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0001
(1.52) (2.20) (0.41) (0.13) (0.54) (-0.03)
VC Dummy 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
(1.11) (-0.66) (-2.23) (1.95) (2.35) (2.64)
Tech Dummy 0.0004 0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0001 0.0006∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ -0.0005
(1.19) (2.73) (-0.38) (2.18) (2.34) (-1.62)
LogAge -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0001
(-1.01) (-0.81) (-0.81) (-2.62) (-1.32) (-0.50)
Constant 0.0039 0.0102 0.0006 0.0075∗∗ 0.0045∗∗ 0.0045
(1.03) (1.53) (0.25) (2.17) (1.96) (1.20)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Regression table: First day returns. This table shows the results for a set of ordinary least squares regressions
explaining the underpricing phenomenon. The most important result is that evident from the first column:
the positive sentiment influences positively e significantly the first-day returns, also after controlling for the
usual set of underpricing explanatory variable, industry and year fixed effect, and also the coverage effect as
measures as number of words.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns
N. words 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗
(3.33) (3.49) (3.37) (3.52) (3.33) (3.54)
positive sentiment 12.13∗∗∗
(2.79)
negative sentiment 2.936
(1.13)
uncertainty sentiment 9.425∗
(1.92)
litigious sentiment -1.720
(-0.25)
modalweak sentiment 14.36∗
(1.92)
modalstrong sentiment -7.092
(-1.60)
Log of Proceeds 0.0170 0.0139 0.0163 0.0138 0.0159 0.0116
(0.60) (0.49) (0.58) (0.49) (0.56) (0.41)
Offer price revision 1.176∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.185∗∗∗
(7.99) (8.06) (7.98) (8.06) (7.96) (8.04)
Tech Dummy 0.166∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(3.24) (3.22) (3.21) (3.35) (3.21) (3.27)
VC Dummy 0.0640 0.0635 0.0610 0.0623 0.0605 0.0672∗
(1.62) (1.60) (1.54) (1.57) (1.53) (1.70)
Reputation 1.031∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗
(2.78) (2.77) (2.87) (2.86) (2.84) (2.85)
Analyst Dummy 0.113∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(2.82) (2.88) (2.84) (2.87) (2.88) (2.85)
Age -0.00178∗ -0.00188∗∗ -0.00178∗ -0.00188∗∗ -0.00182∗ -0.00183∗∗
(-1.92) (-2.01) (-1.90) (-2.01) (-1.95) (-1.97)
Avg_Return 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗
(9.85) (9.69) (9.67) (9.70) (9.74) (9.74)
%IPO above mid -0.00436∗∗∗ -0.00415∗∗∗ -0.00407∗∗∗ -0.00413∗∗∗ -0.00414∗∗∗ -0.00417∗∗∗
(-3.64) (-3.46) (-3.39) (-3.44) (-3.45) (-3.48)
Constant 0.0682 0.0971 0.0440 0.123 0.0528 0.158
(0.11) (0.16) (0.07) (0.21) (0.09) (0.26)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Regression table: Price Revision. This table shows the results for a set of ordinary least squares regressions
explaining the price revision phenomenon. The most important result is that evident from the first column: the
positive sentiment influences positively e significantly the price revision, also after controlling for the usual set
of underpricing explanatory variable, industry and year fixed effect, and also the coverage effect as measures as
number of words.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
price revision price revision price revision price revision price revision price revision
N. words 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002∗ 0.0000002 0.0000002∗
(1.54) (1.64) (1.52) (1.65) (1.50) (1.66)
positive sentiment 1.725∗∗
(2.17)
negative sentiment 0.223
(0.49)
uncertainty sentiment 1.773∗∗
(1.99)
litigious sentiment 0.0970
(0.08)
modal weak sentiment 2.844∗∗
(2.09)
modal strong sentiment -0.315
(-0.38)
Log of Proceeds 0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0395∗∗∗
(8.31) (8.30) (8.36) (8.29) (8.36) (8.28)
Tech Dummy 0.0130∗ 0.0131∗ 0.0123 0.0134∗ 0.0121 0.0133∗
(1.65) (1.66) (1.56) (1.70) (1.53) (1.69)
VC Dummy 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0184∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗
(2.61) (2.69) (2.58) (2.68) (2.54) (2.70)
Reputation 0.173∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(2.76) (2.77) (2.82) (2.80) (2.80) (2.80)
Age -0.000516∗∗∗ -0.000527∗∗∗ -0.000510∗∗∗ -0.000527∗∗∗ -0.000515∗∗∗ -0.000526∗∗∗
(-3.22) (-3.28) (-3.17) (-3.28) (-3.21) (-3.28)
AvgReturn 0.000282 0.000265 0.000263 0.000268 0.000273 0.000270
(1.26) (1.18) (1.17) (1.19) (1.22) (1.20)
%IPO above mid 0.00170∗∗∗ 0.00174∗∗∗ 0.00174∗∗∗ 0.00174∗∗∗ 0.00173∗∗∗ 0.00174∗∗∗
(8.16) (8.34) (8.36) (8.33) (8.31) (8.33)
Constant -0.273∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗
(-9.45) (-9.28) (-9.51) (-9.31) (-9.46) (-9.22)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474 1474
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Regression table: First day returns controlling for the informational content of S-1 files. This table shows the
results for a set of ordinary least squares regressions explaining the underpricing phenomenon adding also the
informational effect of S-1 files. The most important results hold: the positive sentiment influences positively e
significantly the first-day returns, also after controlling for the usual set of underpricing explanatory variable,
industry and year fixed effect, and also the coverage effect as measures as number of words. Furthermore the
S-1 negative sentiment is negatively associated with the first-day returns, consistently with our explanation of
first-day returns generated by an increase on the demand side.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns
N. words 0.000001 0.000002 0.000001 0.000002 0.000001 0.000002
(0.98) (1.12) (1.06) (1.14) (1.01) (1.13)
positive sentiment 16.43∗∗
(2.43)
negative sentiment 4.620
(1.08)
uncertainty sentiment 9.166
(1.20)
litigious sentiment 0.651
(0.07)
modal weak sentiment 15.78
(1.35)
modal strong sentiment -8.553
(-1.25)
S1 negative sentiment 19.55∗∗ 19.95∗∗ 19.23∗∗ 20.16∗∗ 19.58∗∗ 20.10∗∗
(2.36) (2.40) (2.30) (2.42) (2.35) (2.42)
Constant -0.200 -0.190 -0.203 -0.141 -0.199 -0.102
(-0.28) (-0.26) (-0.28) (-0.20) (-0.28) (-0.14)
Usual Checks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 697 697 697 697 697 697
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Regression table: Price Revision controlling for the informational content of S-1 files. This table shows the
results for a set of ordinary least squares regressions explaining the price revision phenomenon adding also the
informational effect of S-1 files. The most important results hold: the positive sentiment influences positively e
significantly the first-day returns, also after controlling for the usual set of underpricing explanatory variable,
industry and year fixed effect, and also the coverage effect as measures as number of words. Furthermore the
S-1 negative sentiment is negatively associated with the price revision, consistently with our expectations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
price revision price revision price revision price revision price revision price revision
N. words 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002 0.0000002
(1.14) (1.24) (1.18) (1.23) (1.13) (1.24)
positive sentiment 2.163∗
(1.94)
negative sentiment -0.681
(-0.98)
uncertainty sentiment 1.107
(0.89)
litigious sentiment -2.197
(-1.42)
modal weak sentiment 2.867
(1.51)
modal strong sentiment -0.315
(-0.28)
S1 negative sentiment 0.799 0.907 0.786 0.820 0.816 0.871
(0.59) (0.66) (0.57) (0.60) (0.60) (0.64)
Constant -0.251∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗
(-4.72) (-4.40) (-4.72) (-4.60) (-4.73) (-4.63)
Usual Checks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 797 797 797 797 797 797
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Regression table: First day returns using the residuals. In this table the results of ordinary least squares
regressions are reported. Differently than before instead of the sentiment variables here are reported the
residuals of them after having regressed the sentiment variables on the ex-ante IPO firm characteristics. Also
after this control the results in explaining the underpricing are confirmed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns First-day returns
N. Words 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗
(5.81) (5.91) (5.85) (5.94) (5.82) (5.94)
xpositive 9.873∗
(1.84)
x_negative 2.119
(0.67)
x_uncertain 6.373
(1.06)
x_litigious -4.585
(-0.55)
x_modal weak 9.859
(1.07)
x_modal strong -8.222
(-1.51)
Constant 0.370∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(17.56) (17.54) (17.55) (17.56) (17.56) (17.59)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Regression table: Price Revision using the residuals. In this table the results of ordinary least squares
regressions are reported. Differently than before instead of the sentiment variables here are reported the
residuals of them after having regressed the sentiment variables on the ex-ante IPO firm characteristics. Also
after this control the results in explaining the price revision are confirmed. hold.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision
N. Words 0.000001∗∗∗ 0.000001∗∗∗ 0.000001∗∗∗ 0.000001∗∗∗ 0.000001∗∗∗ 0.000001∗∗∗
(4.05) (4.13) (4.04) (4.14) (4.02) (4.14)
x_positive 1.577∗
(1.73)
x_negative 0.132
(0.25)
x_uncertain 1.641
(1.61)
x_litigious -0.0843
(-0.06)
x_modal weak 2.452
(1.57)
x_modal strong -0.276
(-0.29)
Constant 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗
(7.96) (7.93) (7.96) (7.92) (7.96) (7.92)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1473 1473 1473 1473 1473 1473
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Regression table . Heckman selection model for First Day Returns – two-step estimates (regression model
with sample selection.). With this model we want to test for possible sample selection bias due to the fact
that only for the IPOs that receive a coverage we are able to determine the quality of the coverage (i.e. the
sentiment). For this reason we apply a Heckman two.stage model where in the first step we run a probit
using as dependent variable the News dummy and the LogProceeds as an instrument, while in the second
step we use the predicted values to correctly estimate models for the underpricing phenomenon.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing Underpricing
positive sentiment 13.16∗∗∗
(3.08)
negative sentiment 0.990
(0.40)
litigious sentiment -5.930
(-0.95)
uncertainty sentiment 2.427
(0.51)
modal weak sentiment 0.918
(0.13)
modal strong sentiment 3.377
(0.77)
Offer price revision 1.585∗∗∗ 1.608∗∗∗ 1.597∗∗∗ 1.608∗∗∗ 1.609∗∗∗ 1.611∗∗∗
(8.07) (8.16) (8.08) (8.17) (8.16) (8.18)
Tech Dummy 0.117∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(3.06) (3.20) (3.24) (3.18) (3.21) (3.24)
VC Dummy 0.137∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(3.61) (3.76) (3.68) (3.72) (3.73) (3.70)
Reputation 0.536 0.587 0.610 0.592 0.597 0.602
(1.40) (1.53) (1.59) (1.54) (1.55) (1.57)
LogAge -0.0923∗∗∗ -0.0935∗∗∗ -0.0936∗∗∗ -0.0933∗∗∗ -0.0936∗∗∗ -0.0930∗∗∗
(-5.07) (-5.11) (-5.12) (-5.10) (-5.12) (-5.08)
Constant 0.390∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(2.62) (2.97) (3.12) (2.94) (3.00) (2.90)
News News News News News News
LogProceeds 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(7.53) (7.53) (7.53) (7.53) (7.53) (7.53)
Price revision 1.334∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗
(7.03) (7.03) (7.03) (7.03) (7.03) (7.03)
Tech Dummy -0.0953 -0.0953 -0.0953 -0.0953 -0.0953 -0.0953
(-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.75)
VC Dummy 0.141∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(2.59) (2.59) (2.59) (2.59) (2.59) (2.59)
Reputation 1.138∗∗ 1.138∗∗ 1.138∗∗ 1.138∗∗ 1.138∗∗ 1.138∗∗
(2.36) (2.36) (2.36) (2.36) (2.36) (2.36)
LogAge -0.0302 -0.0302 -0.0302 -0.0302 -0.0302 -0.0302
(-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13)
Constant -1.097∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗
(-7.58) (-7.58) (-7.58) (-7.58) (-7.58) (-7.58)
mills
lambda -0.119 -0.122 -0.131 -0.121 -0.121 -0.119
(-0.79) (-0.81) (-0.87) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-0.79)
Observations 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810 2810
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Regression table . Heckman selection model for Price Revision – two-step estimates (regression model with
sample selection. With this model we want to test for possible sample selection bias due to the fact that
only for the IPOs that receive a coverage we are able to determine the quality of the coverage (i.e. the
sentiment). For this reason we apply a Heckman two.stage model where in the first step we run a probit
using as dependent variable the News dummy and the LogProceeds as an instrument, while in the second
step we use the predicted values to correctly estimate models for the price revision pattern.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision Price Revision
positive sentiment 2.101∗∗
(2.50)
negative sentiment -0.296
(-0.61)
litigious sentiment -1.171
(-0.91)
uncertainty sentiment -0.0222
(-0.02)
modal weak sentiment -0.366
(-0.26)
modal strong sentiment -0.131
(-0.15)
Tech Dummy 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗
(3.16) (3.27) (3.21) (3.24) (3.25) (3.24)
VC Dummy 0.00702 0.00817 0.00772 0.00820 0.00836 0.00827
(0.70) (0.80) (0.75) (0.81) (0.82) (0.81)
Reputation -0.0651 -0.0540 -0.0553 -0.0572 -0.0564 -0.0573
(-0.65) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.56) (-0.56) (-0.57)
LogAge -0.0119∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.0121∗∗
(-2.47) (-2.49) (-2.47) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.49)
Constant 0.183∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(5.35) (5.70) (5.68) (5.62) (5.66) (5.64)
News News News News News News
LogProceeds 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(8.91) (8.91) (8.91) (8.91) (8.91) (8.91)
Dummy Tech -0.0505 -0.0505 -0.0505 -0.0505 -0.0505 -0.0505
(-0.95) (-0.95) (-0.95) (-0.95) (-0.95) (-0.95)
VC Dummy 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.71) (2.71) (2.71) (2.71) (2.71)
Reputation 1.123∗∗ 1.123∗∗ 1.123∗∗ 1.123∗∗ 1.123∗∗ 1.123∗∗
(2.37) (2.37) (2.37) (2.37) (2.37) (2.37)
LogAge -0.0408 -0.0408 -0.0408 -0.0408 -0.0408 -0.0408
(-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.56)
Constant -1.208∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗
(-8.55) (-8.55) (-8.55) (-8.55) (-8.55) (-8.55)
mills
lambda -0.201∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(-5.90) (-5.90) (-5.90) (-5.90) (-5.90) (-5.91)
Observations 2877 2877 2877 2877 2877 2877
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Media and Finance: A Review
Carlo Raimondo∗
Abstract
Understanding which is the role played by media in modern economies and, specifically, in financial
markets has become a central point in the economic and finance academia. Even though an increasingly
number of researches are proposed every year, we still lack a systematic review of what has been done and
what has still to be searched. This paper aims to mind this gap, systematically and completely review
related research papers.
I. Introduction
One should hardly have to tell
academicians that information is a valuable
resource: knowledge is power.
George J. Stigler
The Economic of Information,
The Journal of Political Economy, 1961
In the last decades the relationship between the media industry and the financial one hasbecome increasingly important and studied. To understand which role media outlets playto the respect of markets and investors has been and it still is very challenging aim among
economic and financial scholars. The old-fashion textbook idea of perfectly rational markets in
which media are not substantially able to provide any real new information, due to the arbitrage-
free condition1, is day by day challenged and denied. Empirical studies have proved how media
are effectively able to influence financial markets in several ways. Research community classified
the nature of this relationship in different ways, according to different views on the role of media
and on the quality of media products.
∗PhD Student, University of Bologna, Department of Management, Via Capo di Lucca 34, 40126 Bologna, Italy.
Corresponding author: carlo.raimondo@unibo.it.
1Following the arbitrage-free theory all the information is immediately used and discounted on the financial markets
in the exact same moment in which it becomes available to anyone. Media require time to detect, process, package, and
deliver the same information and therefore they should not be able to provide any market-sensitive information. Even
though an efficient media is able to arrive to delivering very quickly, it should be by construction always late.
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In this paper I am not going to argue the effectiveness of media on financial markets or the
importance of media industry in the Internet era. Main aim of this review is to put together the
numerous and sometimes discordant contributions to this field of research with the ambition of
detect and underline common paths in order to actually understand the findings of this important
stream of research. Moreover I will reserve a special section to summarize the main contributions
to the stream of research which explains the media industry functioning, with a special focus on
the media decision in terms of quality of produced information. Finally .a brief part of this paper
will be devoted to the description and discussion of the main methodologies that have been used
and created to process media outcomes data, namely data that assume the form of a simple text,
like a newspaper’s article or the transcription of a TV broadcast.
II. Why Media Matter
I. What is information and the role of media
The importance of information has been at length discussed in both empirical and theoretical
literature. Starting from Von Hayek (1937; 1945) a large body of literature has been developed
in economics about the role of information, with a special focus on economic theory. George
Stigler and the University of Chicago school systematically addressed the topic, considering the
role of information not per se but as an improvement to the theory of General Equilibrium2. In this
framework, information and information spread and availability have to be considered as a crucial
issue inside the model, but without discussing the main assumptions, logic, and results of the
model itself. The contribution by Stigler (1961) points out which is the price of being not-informed
and which is the role played by information dealers’ to actually delivering and sharing reliable
information3. Different is the viewpoint of Joseph Stiglitz, who devoted a large part of his prolific
research activity to the role of information in the economy (Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz 1976;
Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz 1980; J. E. Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; B. Greenwald, J. E. Stiglitz, and Weiss
1984; B. C. Greenwald and J. E. Stiglitz 1986; J. E. Stiglitz 1987; J. E. Stiglitz 2000; J. E. Stiglitz 2002).
Stiglitz’s main idea is focused on the necessity to devote a special attention to the information
in modern economies: information has not to be considered a part of previous paradigm but
2Basing on the Arrow-Debreu model (Arrow and Debreu 1954) and its improvements (e.g. McKenzie 1959)
3”Reputation is a word which denotes the persistency of quality, and reputation commands a price because it economizes
on search.” (Stigler 1961). Here the author is referring to the markets of goods but it is easy to understand the
generalizability of this theory. Accessing information, about a good’s price or about a listed firm that issues financial
instruments, is high costly and the best possible outcome involves the presence of a form of information intermediary which
consumers or investors may actually trust. In this way the cost of accessing information is lowered.
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it has to become the central focus of what Stiglitz named the information economy. Information
and information asymmetries are at the centre of the research activities of two other outstanding
economists, who contribute dramatically to change academic view on information topic. Akerlof
(1970) introduced the idea of informational asymmetries and their role in competitive markets;
Spence (1973) firstly addressed the idea of costly signalling mechanisms in presence of difficulties
and costs in measuring unknown qualities (e.g. in the job market).
II. The media informative role
Understanding the importance and the value of information is critic in understanding the impor-
tance of information communication, creation, and distribution. In modern economies professional
figures have been created to deal with this issue, creating the media industry. As soon as individuals
and organizations understood the importance and the worth of accessing a good information
setting, media firms were founded. Media owners and entrepreneurs found this form of economic
activity profitable, investors and individuals found important to access their product. Looking at
the media sector as an industry inside the economy and not on a side of it is crucial to understand
the media industry functioning. If media industry is nothing more and nothing different than
a set of firms maximizing profits and not a sort of public service devoted to distribute a public
good, it is easy to understand the importance of accurately analysing its functioning mechanisms.
Jensen in his 1976 paper (1979) first identified the main problem that could arise in the media
industry between information quality and markets forces. In the media sector the idea of optimal
equilibrium following a fair market competition is, as the matter of the facts, almost impossible to
be applied. Jensen argues the phenomena and topics usually described by newspapers’ articles
are, in most cases, too difficult and to complex to be honestly and completely reported to the
audience. In this situation a newspaper has to be understood by its readers and this leads to a
sort of demand for slant. Jensen uses this finding to demonstrate that a special regulation for
this kind of industry is necessary. This is a first key-point of this review: media industry is an
important and developed industry formed by firms among which the vast majority are in business
for profit, not for ethical reasons or for providing a public good. Furthermore even the quality
of the outcome, i.e. the information, cannot be evaluated unequivocally. As I will show in the
proceedings of this review, not all the audience wants the highest quality information, a relevant
part of it wants instead to have their beliefs confirmed4, independently to what actually happened.
4This phenomenon has been widely investigated in the economic and financial literature, among the others by
Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005. In their paper the authors show how if the readers in a newspaper’s audience have strong
shared beliefs, for the newspaper is very unlikely and difficult to go against these beliefs, even though there could be
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The very special relationship between competition among firms and outcomes’ quality, specific
of the media sector, will be one of the key-points of Section IV. Hereinafter this research paper
will try to disentangle the different ideas scholars have produced about the effects of media on
financial markets and some possible feature at the base of media industry functioning.
III. The Media Industry
Media are information dealers, able to select facts, happenings, judgements, firms’ results, and
transform it in pieces of news to be delivered to their audience. Articles and all kinds of piece
of news come from facts and opinions that media judge enough important and interesting to be
delivered to their audience. In this process media judging is very vast and crucial: it is what
transform in a news something that could also not become a news. To these extents media power
is huge and indisputable. Which are the boundaries to this free will?
Classical view of media industry is based on the reputation effect that relies on multiple
observation of single media outlet’s outcomes. Consumers (i.e. audience, or readers) are willing
to pay to be informed by a media firm if they judge it in a positive way. Judging should be
based on past observation of the media itself,providing in this way the right incentive to the
media to reach and maintain an high quality standard in order to both keep its audience and,
possibly, conquest new consumers in the competition against other media firms. According to this
framework the presence of free market competition, several media firms, and rationality among
consumers, produce a dynamic equilibrium in which low reputed media are pushed out from
the market by the higher reputed ones. Furthermore the information produced by this kind of
situation is levelled on the highest quality5, that basically means effective information, able to
describe and even predict political and economic facts and changes at the best. No room has
been left for irrationality, or for a different role of media different than the delivering of the best
informative set available in each single moment.
Is media sector actually working in this way? And, more importantly, it is delivering actually
new news? The novelty of media produced pieces of news assumes a more important value
if referred to economic news and, particularly, to financial markets related contents. If media
are delivering exclusively pieces of news already known by market participants and already
discounted in assets’ prices, no reactions on financial markets should follow the disclosure of new
strong evidence and supportive sources supporting it.
5In equilibrium all not reputed media firms, producing low-quality information, should be overcome by highly reputed
media firms producing high-quality information. As a result, we have on the market only high quality information
produced by the most competitive media firms.
98
Ph.D. Thesis - Carlo Raimondo - carlo.raimondo@unibo.it
contents. At the contrary, if media are actually able to deal new information or, at least, valuable
signals to markets’ participants, financial markets should react systematically to news’ disclosure
by reliable media outlets. Several scholars did study this phenomenon in order to test the so called
markets efficiency hypothesis in several contexts and applying different methodologies. Furthermore,
when markets efficiency hypothesis has been rejected, a very wide set of explanations have been
proposed. In the next section I will go to describe the most important research works in more
details, always trying to consider at the same time their contribution to the field of research.
I. Effects on Financial Markets
Curiously, the first contribution about role of media on financial markets is able to put together
media inefficiency in delivering information and media effectiveness on financial markets. Huber-
man and Regev in their 2001 paper analyzed the effect of an article published on the Sunday’s
edition of the New York Times about a small firm fighting to find a cure for cancer. No real news,
no new facts or analysis were involved in the article. All information was already available from
five months earlier, but stock markets did react hugely to the news6, arriving to haul all the
bio-tech sector on the stock exchange. Their findings were motivated by a view in which the
induced public attention is able to generate a permanent higher stock price, even though no
new information is actually delivered. A somehow coherent result is contained in the paper by
Dyck and Zingales (2003): the authors find that earnings announcements that are massively and
optimistically reported by the press are more likely to generate rises in stock prices, and with
a greater magnitude. They also find the effect to be greater, fewer are the media following the
news and higher is the reputation of the media itself. Media firms are here supposed to follow
sources that are internal to the reported firms: in order to obtain internal (i.e. private) information,
journalists are willing to reward their sources with a better (i.e. positively slanted) coverage7.
Johnson et al. (2005) studied the effect of being covered for a firm’s executives in the ratings
published periodically by Business Week magazine. Both positive and negative judgements for a
firm’s executives produce positive abnormal returns for its stock price. The effect is not produced
by the quality of the information but by the simple fact to be covered and to jump to the investors’
attention (coverage effect). Tetlock (2007) tried to systematically and objectively quantify the content
of textual information8. In its paper published on The Journal of Finance, he finds that media
6The EntreMed stock price grew up from 12 USD closing price on Friday to 85 USD opening price on Monday.
7Dyck and Zingales named this relationship the ”qui pro quo” condition that is effectively a source of conflict of interest
between media outlet and firm the media’s articles are about.
8Addressing this issue has been for a long time an obstacole to the development of this kind of research. In Section
IV I will provide a brief overview of the methodologies used, and I will discuss the most important advantages and
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pessimism is a good predictor of financial markets’ downwards associated with an increase in
the trading volume. Tetlock provided in this way a strong evidence of media effectiveness on
the financial markets, even though the mechanism of propagation between media and investors
is still uncertain. Similarly but in a different setting DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) proved the
effectiveness of media referring to the politics9. Political elections may be easily view as a sort
of market in which individuals decide not about their wealth investment but about their commu-
nities governments. Furthermore electors have to decide basing on the information they have
together with the beliefs they hold. DellaVigna and Kaplan showed how electors are heavily and
significantly influenced by news’ quality and news preferences toward a specific political party.
In their paper the authors focus on the effects of Republican-friendly Fox-News TV spread in the
U.S., finding an increase in votes for Republican candidates after the arrive of Fox-News TV in
each single county. Media are then effective, at least in generating a shared consensus on specific
beliefs. Following the reasoning of the authors, we may argue that investors do not completely
change their mind toward the opposite party, but they were effectively motivated to sustain their
party after observing their ideas to be sustained by media. Translating this reasoning in financial
terms, we do not observe to a change in already active investors, but we see how inactive investors
may go to the markets when they observe their idea to be sustained by the media, generating in
this way an increase in volume (in politics, more people to vote) and generating more demand on
the chosen stocks (the supported parties receive more votes). Engelberg (2008) studies tried to
disentangle the effect of hard (i.e. numbers, results that can be easily quantified) to soft (comment,
opinions, and all what is not possible to be quantified) information in the earnings announcements
empirical setting. He found the qualitative information to be effective on stock markets and, on the
top of that, to be more effective than quantified information.
Joe et al. (2009), relying on the findings of the previous paper of Allen et al. (2006), developed
a model in which media play an important role towards financial markets by deciding to cover or
not firms’ board ineffectiveness. When media devote space and attention to boards’ ineffectiveness
issues, financial markets react differently according to their nature: individual investors react
penalizing the firm; at the contrary institutional investors and professional seem to be able to
disadvantages of each of them.
9Why reporting here something not directly linked to financial markets? The main reason is that in term of information
disclosure patterns and media role financial markets and political markets are not so dissimilar. Precisely referring to the
occurrence of elections a large numbers of individuals (the electors) have to decide about something important with a
limited informative set. Therefore they will see and understand their choice’s results only in a later stage. These patterns
are very close to those involving an individual investor who goes to the financial markets deciding about something
important basing on a limited informative set.
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anticipate the news’ delivering by media. This contribution somehow links this literature to that
one about corporate governance role of media I am going to present in a special section of this
paper. Both the paper by Bushee et al. (2010) and Bushman et al. (2010) look at the media as
essentially information dealers. In their view media are actually able to deliver new information
to the market, using their professional skill to find the not already public information. Bushman
et al. (2010) find out a dissemination of private information due to the relationship between
landers and borrower; Bushee et al. (2010) instead provide evidence of the media role in solving
information asymmettries in the case of earnings announcement. Tetlock (2010) has provided
further investigation about the possibility and the ability of media in resolving informational
asymmetries among investors in financial markets. In his paper the author analyses to which
extents media are effectively able to deliver to markets and investors new information. Basing
on a set of price-sensitive events, Tetlock showed how part of financial markets participants
are actually predicting media contents, reaching though sensitive news before media publish it.
These investors then exploit this information trading consequentially. The other part of investors
is instead responsive to media-delivered news, reacting to it in terms of trading activity only
after media disclosure. In this view media play the important role of setting the field, aligning
informed and not-informed investors’ informative sets. Media action results in strengthening
the market efficiency, resolving the provisional information misalignment among investors. The
main challenge in analyzing media role and effects on financial markets consists in correctly
understanding what is due to the events reported by the media and what instead is due to the
media reporting itself. In order to address this issue, Engelberg and Parson (2011) exploited
the differences in the media content diffusion in different geographical areas inside the United
States. Due to the role of local-diffused newspapers, different sets of investors receive different
informational sets. Using data from local trading, the authors show how local newspapers’
coverage on earnings announcements strongly predicts local trading, even considering for a
wide set of possible compounding factors. Furthermore the authors provide evidence about the
linkage between local trading activity and the local media news disclosure timing. Birz and Lott
(2011) analyzed how financial markets react to real sector economic news. In their paper they
provided empirical evidence about the role of media in information diffusion. They showed how
economic news covered by and reported by media outlets are more likely to be able to influence
financial markets massively. Consistently whit the previously mentioned research papers, it may
be said that media are not only able to be effective in focusing the public attention on some
specific topics, but they have a wider role in financial markets. Media in fact may also spread
not-new pieces of information, pretending they are actually news and conditioning in this way
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their audiences. To understand if news’ consumers (i.e. investors) rely on media disclosure,
Tetlock (2011) analyzed what happens when media publish stale information. Evidence from
his paper shows how individual investors over-react to stale information generating in this way
stronger momentum for stocks with higher participation of individual investors’ trading. In
the media industry professional journalists play a pivotal role, contributing to the generation of
news and to the information processing process. Furthermore some of them are able to become
well known and followed public figures, characterizing themselves with specific characteristics.
Understanding the role of the single indivudual journalist in the big puzzle of financial media
seems to be important, since they can influence importantly the information disclosure process.
Dougal et al (2012) take in account for such a phenomenon analyzing the stock markets reactions
to media delivered news including a journalist fixed-effect. In their framework the authors
have been able to show how financial news impact on stock markets is effective and significant.
Similarly Ahern and Sosyura (2015) study the single journalist effect in terms of reputation and
expertise they bring to the articles they authored. According to them, accuracy of news is well
predicted by journalist’s experience, specialized education, and industry expertise. Furthermore
they show how media are often able to light the spot on important and effective facts, generating
important consequences on the financial markets. Solomon and Soltes (2012) underline the risk
of manipulated media, in a view in which firms’ managers try to influence and manipulate the
press in their favor. Empirical evidence though weakly supports their framework. Aman (2013)
provides additional evidences about media role in financial markets, especially during bubbles
and crashes, focusing on the Japanese stock market. Papers by Boudoukh (2013), Ferguson et al.
(2014), Kraussl and Mirgorodskaya (2014), and Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014) contribute to
strength the empirical evidences of a causal and significant effect of media on financial markets.
Nevertheless detecting media content causal effects on financial markets is a critical point in the
financial literature: Peress (2014) used newspapers strikes to understand when and how media
influence the markets, providing a convincing proof of media effectiveness in a cross-country
sample. For completeness papers showing not relevant effect of media on financial markets have
to been mentioned here. Actually just few papers show an not effective role of media on financial
market. The most important is that by Bhattacharya et al. (2009). The paper finds no important
role of media during the IPO bubble in the nineties. Investors’ irrationality was not generated
or at least, not fully explained by media behaviours in processing information. Also in this
case media effectivenessss, even if negated, is actually confirmed. Media are noresponsiblele for
market irrationality during the high-tech IPO bubble but they just contribute to spread investors’
sentiment.
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II. The Corporate Governance Role of Media
Media has been often viewed as a very special industry. Among the many, the media ability
to condition other industries business is the prominent one. Furthermore media play a very
important role towards all the markets and the institutions whose functioning is guaranteed by a
reputation based equilibrium. If reputation is important for firms, media are able to influence it
and firms have to properly consider the reputational risk if their bad bahaviour could be covered
by media. This is what is usually called the Corporate Governance Role of Media. First research
paper underling this issue refer to the public sector and to the administration of States and Local
Governments. Islam (2002; 2003; 2006) analyzed how countries with more developed media sectors
are associated with better governments and smaller levels of corruption. Besley and Prat (2006)
find similar conclusion developing a formal economic model for the corruption framework in
which media role is questioned when the media sector is deeply conditioned by the governments
itself. Egerov et al. (2009) proved how media are relevant in fighting public corruption and
bribing in the setting of developing economies states ruled by dictatorships: the authors show
how dictatorships located in resoruces poor countries are less likely to try to control the press and
more likely to allow free press in order to provide the right incentives to their bureaucrats and
therefore to improve the quality of government.
Media role has a pivotal role also when we refer to the private sector and to the business
administration. The papers by Becht et al. (2003), Johnson et al. (2005), and Miller (2006) shift the
focus on the media role on firms and firms’ stakeholders. Both of the papers show how efficient
media activity is able to preserve and guarantee stakeholders’ wealth against possible frauds or
manipulations operated by firms executives. They are the first to properly emphasize the role of
media in the business sector governance. Dyck et al. (2008) studied the role of media in the Russia
corporate sector, finding the foreign media to be more effective than the domestic ones due to some
reputational issues and to the fact of notefficient and scarcely reliable doemstic media industry.
The importance of media industry characteristics and efficency to be able to play the corporate
governance role is crucial. Only reputed and followed media may obtain the effect of influence
efficiently and sistmaticaly private sector corporate governace, acting like watchdog (Miller 2006)
and not like a lapdog (Bednar 2012) in dislosing and preventing corporate frauds (Dyck, Morse,
and Zingales 2010). Several scholars studied the role of media in corporate governance referring to
peculiar phenomena, like executive copensation, board efficency and executive decisions. Media
play also a role in the executive compensation puzzle, leveraging on the reputational cost of
incongruous compensations. Core et al. (2008) linked media coverage of firms’ activities to a
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correct and efficient executive compensation. Media effects on executive compensation is also
put in evidence by the work by Kunhen and Niessen (2012) where the role of public opinion is
properly considered. Related to this topic Joe et. al. (2009) undelined how media can be important
also in covering board inefficencies. Other scholar studied the role of media in case of dual class
shares unification and shareholders protection (Lauterbach and Pajuste 2012), or in cases of capital
allocation decisions (B. Liu and McConnell 2013), or also in case of insider trading disclosure and
prevention (Dai, Parwada, and Zhang 2015).
IV. Textual Analysis in Finance
A big boost in the literature about role of information and media in the financial sector was
generated by the creation and the subsequent availability of methodologies to process textual
data. Media outcomes as well as the vast majority of what we call information is usually in form
of written text. Analyzing this kind of content has been challenging for a long period: it was
difficult and time-consuming to process a sufficient big size of data by hand and, at the same time,
objectivity and replicability of this kind of researches were very disputable10. One of the first
attempt to apply automatic (i.e. not performed by humans) analysis of textual is that by Paul
Tetlock (2007). He built some measures of texts’ sentiment essentially based on Hardvard Dictionaries.
Tetlock also introduced the word list methodology, where a set of words indicating positiveness,
negativeness, or other connotations is defined and then used counting in each article or generic text
the sum of the occurrences of all the words of each list. Linguistically pretty simple and even dirty,
this is still the most used and effective approach in financial textual analysis. Tetlock et al. (2008)
tried to improve the textual analysis method finding an effective way to measure the negative tone
of an article or a text, and they applied their mothodology to earnings announcements finding
significant results. The real watershed in this methodological debate is represented by the paper
published by Loughran and McDonald (2011), where they investigate about financial language
specific characteristics and they developed several word lists able to detect different textual tones,
like the positive tone, the negative tone, the uncertainty tone, and others. This methodology has
been later widely used by several scholars (for instance Dougal et al. 2012 and Ahern and Sosyura
2015). Most recent improvements are those by Kearney and Liu (2014) that tries to put together all
the improvements in the field, and by the two last paper by Loughran and McDonald (2014; 2014)
in which they stressed and enlarged the validity of their methodology published before (Loughran
and McDonald 2011).
10Main issue in this case is related to the human judgement of a content.
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